Return of the eastern giant: An investigation of the participation of the People\u27s Republic of China in the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games. by Yu, Xiaowei
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 
1-1-2008 
Return of the eastern giant: An investigation of the participation of 
the People's Republic of China in the 1980 and 1984 Olympic 
Games. 
Xiaowei Yu 
University of Windsor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd 
Recommended Citation 
Yu, Xiaowei, "Return of the eastern giant: An investigation of the participation of the People's Republic of 
China in the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games." (2008). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 7157. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/7157 
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor 
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, 
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, 
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder 
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would 
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or 
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email 
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. 
RETURN OF THE EASTERN GIANT: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE 1980 
AND 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES 
By 
Xiaowei Yu 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
through the Faculty of Human Kinetics 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Human Kinetics at the 
University of Windsor 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2008 
© 2008 Xiaowei Yu 
1*1 Library and Archives Canada 
Published Heritage 
Branch 
395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Bibliotheque et 
Archives Canada 
Direction du 
Patrimoine de I'edition 
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada 
Your file Votre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-47086-2 
Our file Notre reference 
ISBN: 978-0-494-47086-2 
NOTICE: 
The author has granted a non-
exclusive license allowing Library 
and Archives Canada to reproduce, 
publish, archive, preserve, conserve, 
communicate to the public by 
telecommunication or on the Internet, 
loan, distribute and sell theses 
worldwide, for commercial or non-
commercial purposes, in microform, 
paper, electronic and/or any other 
formats. 
AVIS: 
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive 
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives 
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, 
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public 
par telecommunication ou par Plntemet, prefer, 
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans 
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, 
sur support microforme, papier, electronique 
et/ou autres formats. 
The author retains copyright 
ownership and moral rights in 
this thesis. Neither the thesis 
nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur 
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. 
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de 
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement 
reproduits sans son autorisation. 
In compliance with the Canadian 
Privacy Act some supporting 
forms may have been removed 
from this thesis. 
Conformement a la loi canadienne 
sur la protection de la vie privee, 
quelques formulaires secondaires 
ont ete enleves de cette these. 
While these forms may be included 
in the document page count, 
their removal does not represent 
any loss of content from the 
thesis. 
Canada 
Bien que ces formulaires 
aient inclus dans la pagination, 
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 
Author's Declaration of Originality 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this 
thesis has been published or submitted for publication. 
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon 
anyone's copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, 
quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, 
published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard 
referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted 
material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada 
Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright 
owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such 
copyright clearances to my appendix. 
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as 
approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has 
not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution. 
m 
ABSTRACT 
The Chinese Olympic Committee was recognized by the International Olympic 
Committee in November 1979. Following the reinstatement, between 1980 and 1984, the 
People's Republic of China sent athletes to participate in the 1980 Lake Placid, the 1984 
Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games, and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, while they 
boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. This study investigated the Chinese 
participation in the Olympic Games and the development of Chinese national sport 
between 1980 and 1984, and attempts to respond to the question why the People's 
Republic of China chose the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games instead of the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games as the debut of the Chinese athletes on the global sport stage. 
Conclusions were reached through an analysis of three primary data sources: media 
reports; organizational archives; and key actor interviews. The research revealed that 
between 1980 and 1984, Chinese national sport served the national interests of the 
People's Republic of China and was deeply influenced by the changing international 
political environment. The government of the People's Republic of China made the 
decision to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games as well as to boycott the 1980 
Moscow Olympic Games in order to realize its diplomatic strategies and maximize its 
national interests. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Introductory Background 
On the night of 8 August 2007, people gathered at Beijing Tiananmen Square to 
celebrate the one-year countdown to the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic 
Games. The most important component of the celebration that night was the distribution 
of the invitation letters to the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of Britain, Canada, 
Greece, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by Jacques Rogge, president 
of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).1 As an open expression of support, this 
was the first time in its history that the IOC had shifted the location of the invitation 
ceremony from Lausanne, the headquarter of the IOC, to a host city of the Olympic 
Games.2 In response to the IOC's support, Liu Qi, president of the Beijing Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG), promised the IOC that Beijing would 
improve mutual respect and understanding throughout the world, disseminate Olympic 
knowledge in China, and promote the Olympic spirit. Similar to that of the former 
president Juan Antonio Samaranch,4 Jacques Rogge expressed great expectations for the 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.5 
A friendly and cooperative relationship between the IOC and the PRC has been 
developing throughout the 28 years since the IOC recognized the membership of the 
PRC's Olympic Committee in 1979. In 1980, China sent a 28-athlete delegation to the 
Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games, which marked the first time that the PRC's athletes 
competed in the Olympic arena following their return to the Olympic family. In 1981, Dr. 
He Zhenliang was elected to be the first IOC member from the PRC. In 1985, he was 
elected into the Executive Board of the IOC because of his significant work relative to the 
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Olympic Movement. Four years later, Dr. He Zhenliang was elected as a Vice-President 
of the IOC.6 Simultaneously, Chinese athletes achieved significant progress at the 
Olympic Games. The Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) sent a 225-athlete contingent 
to compete at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. Although their first Summer 
Olympic Games, the achievement (15 gold, 8 silver, and 9 bronze medals) showcased the 
Chinese athletes' potential strengths to the world. Following that, Chinese athletes have 
participated in all the Olympic Games. In particular, at the most recent Summer Olympic 
Games in Athens, the Chinese Olympic team celebrated their best-ever medal haul, 
finishing the Games in second place behind the United States Olympic team. In total, the 
Chinese Olympic teams have won 112 gold, 96 silver, and 78 bronze Olympic medals 
since their return (See Appendix I). In addition, the cooperative and collaborative 
relationship also saw Beijing, the capital of the PRC, bid twice for hosting the Olympic 
Games in both 1993 and 2001. Although the first bid was not successful, it was helpful to 
spread Olympic knowledge throughout China and enhance the development of the 
Olympic Movement in China. The second bid, however, saw Beijing secure the right to 
host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games at the 112th IOC Session in 2001. 
Despite the recent success, and when compared with the positive relationship 
between the IOC and the PRC throughout much of the last three decades, what the 
relationship looked like prior to 1979 was a totally different picture. Following the brutal 
civil war (1947-1949) between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese 
Nationalists (Kuomintang), the former achieved victory in Mainland China and 
established the PRC; having been defeated, the latter retreated to Taiwan. Both parties 
proclaimed that they represented the exclusive regime over China thereby resulting in an 
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ongoing struggle of legal recognition on the international political stage. The struggle 
also extended into the sport domain, specifically, the issue of "two Chinas" in the IOC. 
Based on the attitudes of IOC President Avery Brundage in 1952, suggesting that 
political factors should not be involved in the Olympic Movement, the organization 
attempted to utilize the same formula that it had applied between West and East Germany 
and North and South Korea to resolve the "two Chinas" issue. Under his ideal solution, 
President Brundage suggested that the IOC should recognize both the PRC and Taiwan. 
Having been refused by both sides, neither Brundage nor the PRC government 
compromised their position and denounced each other in the late 1950s.7 In 1958, the 
PRC government announced that they would not cooperate with any organizations 
recognizing "two Chinas" thereby withdrawing from the IOC and all International Sport 
Federations (ISFs). Unable to participate in the Olympic Games, the Chinese athletes 
only competed with the athletes from newly independent African, Asian, and Latin 
o 
American countries, as well as some communist countries during the 1960s. A shift in 
international relations during the 1970s led to a change in the relationship between the 
IOC and the PRC. Sino-USSR relations deteriorated at the beginning of the 1970s, while 
the PRC attempted to open a diplomatic door to the United States. President Brundage 
retired in 1972 and his successor, Lord Killanin, adopted a more flexible stance relative 
to the PRC than his predecessor. Combined, these factors resulted in both sides sitting 
together working on a resolution to the "two Chinas" issue. As a result, both sides 
compromised and the IOC recognized the PRC in 1979. 
The relationship between the IOC and the PRC saw the separation in the 1950s, 
the confrontation in the 1960s, the negotiation in the 1970s, and the cooperation from the 
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1980s up to the present. This study will focus on the development of the Olympic 
Movement in China between 1979 and 1984, a critical transition period. To fully 
understand how the relations shifted during this period and the importance of the 
Olympic Games to the Chinese people, it is necessary for the researcher to introduce a 
broad historical context of the development of the Olympic Movement in China. 
The Development of the Olympic Movement in China 
Beginning with the Shang dynasty, it is generally accepted that ancient Chinese 
history has been recorded for a period spanning almost four thousand years.9 During this 
long history the Chinese people established a relatively advanced civilization. One of the 
most important contributions to the world was ancient Chinese philosophy, which as the 
legacy of humanity in general, benefits people even today. Confucian philosophy, 
advocating righteousness, loyalty, forgiveness, humanity, and tolerance, had significant 
influence on Chinese society. Considered as the basis of political, social, and moral 
structure, Confucianism helped Chinese emperors establish and maintain their feudal 
society.10 However, since Confucianism emphasized improvement of people's mental and 
moral level instead of their physical bodies, Chinese rulers did not focus on the physical 
well being of their citizens.11 Furthermore, Chinese feudal rulers did not encourage 
people to improve their physical strength in order to maintain the stability of the regimes 
more easily. Due to the centralized and hierarchical social environment, specifically in 
the physical culture domain, the competitive nature of sport declined thereby halting the 
physical improvement of the Chinese people. The result saw Chinese traditional sports 
developed differently in styles and rules from modern western sports. Basically, 
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traditional Chinese sports, according to their styles and purposes, are classified into three 
groups: military sports, such as martial arts, archery, and chariot races; medical sports, 
such as Tai Chi, Yang Sheng (keeping fit), Qi Gong (breathing exercises), and massage; 
and recreational games, such as Chess, kite flying, dragon boat racing, and Li- She 
(shooting arrows as part of a ceremony or for amusement).12 Chinese traditional sports 
were not competitive and were only played for military purposes, recreational purposes, 
or entertainment. 
Western modern sports were introduced into China as early as the 1840s 
following the Opium War between the Chinese Qing government and the British 
government.13 Two groups of people, the missionaries with the YMCA systems and the 
returning Chinese students from the Occident, brought the western modern sports into 
China. To enhance physical conditioning of the Chinese youth as well as military 
soldiers, Chinese intellectuals and educationists identified western modern sports such as 
gymnastics and athletics as an efficient and scientific approach thereby widely 
introducing modern sports into new-style schools and military training schools that were 
established between the 1860s and the 1890s.14 Students received training in athletics, 
swimming, fencing, gymnastics, and skating in these schools. In 1890, the earliest sports 
meet with track and field events was held at St. John's College in Shanghai.15 Later, other 
competitive sports, such as basketball and football, appeared in the YMCA schools in 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and other major cities in China by the end of the 
nineteenth century.16 The introduction of western sports and modern physical education 
into China was influential and successful.17 The awareness of the importance of western 
6 
sports for improving not only individual physique but also national strength broadly 
extended in China at the time. 
By 1911, the year the Qing dynasty ended, there were more than twenty-one 
physical education training schools in China.18 With the quick development of modern 
sport in schools, large-scale public athletic meets became an important part of the 
education system in these schools as well as in the major cities. The first All-China 
Colleges and Schools League Games were held in Nanjing in October 1910, which was 
later identified as the First National Athletics Meeting.19 The event was successful and 
attracted numerous spectators. Each day, approximately 40,000 people rushed into the 
stadium to watch the games unfold.20 Between 1910 and 1920, Chinese athletes also 
participated in international sports competitions such as the first and second Far East 
Games. In 1915, the IOC formally invited China to participate in the Games of the VI 
Olympiad, although the Games were cancelled due to World War I. This invitation has 
been generally identified as the first contact between the IOC and the Chinese sport 
administration.21 
On 3 April 1922 the China National Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF) was 
established. Wang Zhengting (1882-1961), Chinese Foreign Minister and a high-ranking 
diplomat, was elected as its president. At the IOC sessions in Paris in July 1922, the 
CNAAF was formally recognized as the Chinese National Olympic Committee, and 
Wang Zhengting was assigned as the first Chinese IOC member. Two years later in 
1924, the All-China (Amateur) Athletic Association (AAA), the first countrywide and 
Chinese-run sport organization, was established in Nanjing.23 This new organization took 
over all functions of the CNAAF. The executives were all Chinese and Wang Zhengting 
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was elected as the first president of the AAA.24 The AAA was not recognized by the IOC 
until 1931.25 Although the AAA did not formally send athletes to the VIII Olympiad in 
Paris in 1924, three Chinese tennis players did participate in the tennis events as 
individual athletes.26 In 1928, the AAA only sent an observer, Mr. Song Ruhai (1890-
1958), to the IX Olympiad due to lack of financial support. His attendance is identified 
as the first time the AAA formally sent an official to the Olympic Games. Song Ruhai's 
impact in China was more significant than competing in the Olympic stadium because of 
29 
the book he wrote, I can compete: Records of Olympic Meetings, published in 1930. His 
manuscript marked the first time that the word "Olympiad" was translated into Chinese. 
The translation, "Wo Neng Bi Ya," means "I can compete!" in English. Song Ruhai was 
attracted by the athletes' high performance, sportsmanship, the Olympic spirit, gender 
equality, and the Olympic effect on the local economy. His book describes the Olympic 
Games held in the Netherlands in their entirety, explains the Olympic ideals and spirits, 
illustrates various sport events and relevant rules, and asserts that the Chinese people 
definitely have the capabilities to compete with western opponents in the Olympic 
stadium. His book, the first of its kind to introduce the significance of the Olympic 
Games to ordinary Chinese people, quickly became very popular in China. 
As Song Ruhai's book ignited the desire of Chinese sport fans to see Chinese 
athletes compete at the Olympic Games, in September 1931, the Japanese army invaded 
three provinces in northeastern China and installed the exiled descendant of the deposed 
Qing emperor, Pu Yi (1906-1967), thereby establishing a "puppet" regime called 
Manchuguo.30To obtain international recognition for Manchuguo and show its 
legitimacy, a Japanese official announced in May 1932 that Liu Changchun and Yu 
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Xiwei, both talented Chinese sprinters, would be representing Manchuguo when 
competing at the Los Angeles Olympic Games. Several days later, in response to the 
Japanese announcement, Liu Changchun made a statement in Tianjin that as a Chinese he 
would only compete for China and he would not represent Manchuguo at the Games of 
the X Olympiad. With a donation of $2,500 from a patriotic Chinese General, the COC 
for the first time formally sent an athlete, Liu Changchun, to compete at the Olympic 
Games. As the only Chinese representative, Liu Changchun arrived at Los Angeles on 
July 29, just one day before the Opening Ceremony of the Games. The following day, a 
small Chinese delegation including Liu Changchun, his coach and translator, and four 
Chinese sport officials who were in the United States, marched in the Los Angeles 
Coliseum during the Opening Ceremony. During the following days, Liu Changchun 
participated in two races, the 100-meter and 200-meter heats. Although he was quickly 
eliminated from both competitions because of the impact of the long trip on his 
conditioning and fatigue, this is considered the debut of Chinese athletes on the Olympic 
stage. 
Four years later, for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, the COC selected sixty-nine 
athletes to compete in the following events: football; track and field; basketball; 
weightlifting; boxing; cycling; and martial arts demonstration. In addition, an observer 
group with 34 Chinese sports officials traveled with the athletes.34 Following a lengthy 
one-month journey at sea, the delegation arrived at Berlin on 23 July 1932.35 The 
delegation received an ovation from hundreds of overseas Chinese and Chinese students 
who were already in Germany. In contrast, during their stay in Berlin, many Chinese 
athletes felt "great discomfort" due to the racial policies of the Nazi hosts. Furthermore, 
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the generally poor performance of the Chinese athletes caused them to feel depressed and 
great shame. Only one athlete, Fu Baolu, passed the initial trials and advanced to the 
final.37 The poor performance at the Games also resulted in a debate between those who 
supported modern sports and those who supported a return to traditional sports. The 
opponents of western sport questioned the development of European sports and physical 
education in China, and contended that the Chinese should use traditional sports, such as 
Chinese martial arts and Chinese meditation, to improve body fitness and mental health. 
They used the 1932 and 1936 Olympic Games as typical examples to denounce the 
fruitless efforts made during the previous 15 years.38 On the other hand, the supporters of 
modern sports stated that it was not wise to deny the superiority of western sports, which 
clearly benefited western people and could also benefit Chinese people. The debate did 
not stop until Japanese troops invaded Beijing in July 1937 causing the eight-year Anti-
Japanese War, which later became part of World War II. 
Neither the debate before the Anti-Japanese-invasion war nor the tragedies during 
the war reduced the desire to develop Chinese modem sports among Chinese sport 
activists. With the government of the Republic of China retreating and settling the 
provisional capital in the western inland city of Chongqing, physical education and 
modern sports were imported into southwestern China. As a result, they became an 
important living style of local residents during wartime.39 In addition, following the 
development of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), physical culture evolved quickly. 
Influenced heavily by the Soviet Union, the first communist sport organization, the 
Soviet Physical Culture and Sports Committee, was established in 1937 at Yan'an,40 
leading to the first CCP Regional Games in 1940.41 The CCP developed Soviet-style 
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sports and emphasized mass sport thereby using physical activity as a means to achieve 
its military improvement. 
Following World War II, encouraged by the great victory, the COC resolved in 
1945 to apply to the IOC to host the XV Olympiad in 1952.43 However, the following 
four years saw China occupied with the struggle for sovereignty between the CCP and 
Kuomintang, which resulted in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949).44 Despite the internal 
struggle, in 1948, the COC still sent a 33-athlete delegation to London to participate in 
the XIV Olympiad, though the delegation did not obtain sufficient financial support to 
finish the Games.45 The athletes competed in five events: track and field; basketball; 
soccer; swimming; and cycling. Predictably, the results were poor and no medals were 
achieved. 
Following the Civil War between the CCP and Kuomintang, which ended in 
1949, the PRC established their own regime throughout mainland China. The 
Kuomintang, defeated by the PRC, fled to Taiwan. China found itself divided into two 
parts: the Republic of China (ROC), located in Taiwan; and the People's Republic of 
China (PRC), which controlled the entire Mainland China except Taiwan Island. Both 
proclaimed that they were the only legitimate government of China. This disagreement 
resulted in the "two Chinas" issue in the IOC. By 1950 the PRC established a country-
wide sporting body, the All-China Sport Federation (ACSF).46 The ACSF took over all 
functions owned by the COC, which was located in Taiwan and was the only legal 
organization the IOC recognized at that time to represent China, even though it had no 
control of the country's sport affairs. IOC President Edstrom (1870-1964) faced the 
dilemma of whether to accept both, only one of them, or neither. However, since Edstrom 
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was planning to retire in 1952, he chose to do nothing relative to this issue during the 
remainder of his presidency.47 
In June 1951, the COC in Taiwan received an invitation from the Helsinki 
Organization Committee of the Olympic Games.48 In February 1952, with the support of 
the Soviet Union, the ACSF decided to attend the Helsinki Olympic Games and argued 
that the ACSF should be the only sport organization to represent China, while the COC in 
Taiwan should not be allowed to attend.49 In response, the IOC stated that the ACSF 
could register a new membership but could not replace the membership of the COC in 
Taiwan, which obviously meant that the IOC would recognize two Olympic Committees 
for China.50The ACSF immediately rejected the IOC's decision and restated the 
exclusivity of the position of the ACSF.51 Facing this situation, in June 1952, only one 
month before the Helsinki Games, IOC President Edstrom announced that neither the 
PRC nor Taiwan would be allowed to participate in the Helsinki Olympic Games.52 
Expectedly, both Beijing and Taiwan protested this decision. Given the protest from both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait, the IOC discussed the "two Chinas" issue in its session on 16 
July 1952, only three days before the Opening Ceremony of the Games.53 The IOC 
provided its members with two choices: both Chinas would participate or neither would 
be allowed. The former choice was selected by 33 to 20 votes.54 Hearing the result and 
considering it a violation of the Olympic Charter, the Taiwan representative immediately 
announced that Taiwan would not attend the Helsinki Games. The ACSF in Beijing 
received the invitation on 18 July 1952, one day before the Opening Ceremony;55 the 
PRC government still sent a 40-athletes delegation to Helsinki. Based on Zhou Enlai 
(1898-1976), the Prime Minister of the PRC at the time, it was a great victory to see the 
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national flag in the Olympic Games, which had important political significance for the 
new regime.56 When the Chinese delegation finally arrived on July 29, most of the events 
had either finished or were in the final phase. Only one Chinese swimmer competed but 
did not qualify for the finals.57 
Following his retirement, Edstrom left the unsolved "two Chinas" issue to his 
successor, Avery Brundage (1887-1975). President Brundage advocated a resolution in 
1954 by which both the PRC and Taiwan would be recognized. Based on Brundage's 
idea, in 1954, the IOC voted by a margin of 23 to 21 to recognize the PRC as a legal 
member of the IOC, thus ensuring that they would be allowed to attend the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games.58 As a result, the IOC recognized two committees in China, 
which violated the Olympic Charter, which stated only one committee would be 
recognized per nation.59 Once again, both the PRC and Taiwan protested. The Taiwan 
representative stated that Taiwan athletes would never compete with the athletes from the 
PRC; the PRC insisted that the Taiwan Olympic Committee must be expelled from the 
IOC.60 Despite the protest, both of them accepted the formal invitations of the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games. The IOC ignored both protests and continued to use 
"Beijing-China" and "Taiwan-China" in documents to the Organizing Committee. There 
were negotiations between Brundage and the representatives from both the PRC and 
Taiwan, respectively. Since Brundage always insisted on using apolitical principles to 
solve political issues in the Olympic Movement, he failed to bring the two parties 
together. As a result, on 6 November 1956, the PRC Olympic Committee declared that 
due to the participation of Taiwan athletes in the Games, and in keeping with their "one 
China" policy, the PRC athletes would not attend the Melbourne Olympic Games.61 
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Eventually only Taiwan athletes competed at the Games under the name of the Republic 
of China. Following the 1956 Olympic Games, to further protest, the PRC announced 
that they would not attend the Asian Games in Tokyo in 1958 because of the participation 
of the Taiwan delegation. Later, in August 1958, the PRC Olympic Committee formally 
withdrew from the IOC and all ISFs. The insistence and absolute inflexibility from both 
the IOC and the PRC resulted in a disconnection for 22 years.64 Following the 
withdrawal, the struggles about the name issue in the IOC between the PRC and Taiwan 
ceased. However, the 'Two Chinas" issue was not over. In the following two decades, the 
three parts, the IOC, the PRC, and Taiwan did not give up any attempts to take advantage 
of sport in their political struggle. 
Taiwan sports improved slowly in the 1950s due to the political struggles between 
the PRC and Taiwan regarding the name issue in the IOC. Since Taiwan did not control 
the sport affairs throughout Mainland China, the IOC decided in 1960 that Taiwan could 
no longer use the name with "China."65 As a result, Taiwan athletes had to compete under 
the name of "Formosa-China" in the 1960 Rome Olympic Games, though the formally 
registered name for Taiwan at the time was the Olympic Committee of the Republic of 
China. Furthermore, the Taiwan delegation was denied visas for the 4th Asian Games by 
Indonesia in 1962 because of the intervention of the PRC.67 These facts showed that the 
ongoing political struggles negatively influenced sport development in Taiwan. 
Despite difficulties, Taiwan athletes still achieved some success in international 
sports competitions. At the third Asian Games in Japan (1958), Taiwan athletes won 6 
gold, 11 silver, and 17 bronze medals; at the fifth Asian Games in Bangkok (1966), the 
Taiwanese shooter Wu Daoyuan won 3 gold medals and 1 bronze medal.68 In particular, 
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an outstanding decathlon athlete from Taiwan, Yang Chuanguang (1933-2007), achieved 
great success during this period. He finished eighth in the decathlon at the 1956 
Melbourne Olympic Games and won the gold medals at both the 2nd and the 3rd Asian 
Games.69 At the 1960 Rome Olympic Games, he competed against an American athlete, 
which has been identified as one of the greatest battles in Taiwan sport history. Despite 
winning seven out of ten events, the American player won in the shot, discus, and javelin, 
which helped him win the gold. Yang Chuangguang's silver medal was the first Olympic 
medal that a Taiwan athlete achieved.70 Another famous Taiwan athlete was a female 
sprinter who also competed at the Rome Olympic Games. Ji Zheng, one of the greatest 
female Asian athletes of the twentieth century, set a series of world records including 
100-meter, 100-yard, 200-meter, and 100-meter hurdle.71 She competed at three Olympic 
Games in 1960,1964, and 1968, and won a bronze medal in the 80-meter hurdle in 1968. 
Her most brilliant achievements came in 1970 when she broke the world record 6 times 
and was elected the best athlete of the year.72 
On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, sport development in the PRC saw a 
different scenario. During the 1950s, the Soviet model of sport training and physical 
education was imparted throughout Mainland China.73 Based on these models, the State 
Physical Education and Sports Commission (the Sport Ministry) was founded in Beijing 
in 1952, whose function was to administer and implement national sport policies and 
physical education programs.74 Basically, Chinese national sport development included 
two branches, the elite sport system and the mass sport system.75 The objectives of PRC 
sport at that time were: develop and maintain good health; promote development of the 
socialist economy; and enhance relationships with other countries.76 
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Following the withdrawal from the IOC in 1958, the PRC sport administration 
realized that they needed to be accepted by more nations thereby attaining more 
international support. Based on this objective, the PRC government and the sport 
administration paid more attention to the third world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and made significant efforts to build good relationships with them.77 The Games 
of the Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO) was the most typical example with which the 
PRC tried to expand their international influence by providing financial aid to third world 
countries in the domain of sport. The original idea of GANEFO emerged after the IOC's 
suspension of Indonesia, the host of the 4th Asian Games. The IOC instituted the penalty 
because Indonesia, influenced by the PRC, prevented Taiwan, the legal members of the 
Asian Games Federation, from participating in the 4th Asian Games.78 By 1962 
Indonesian President Sukarno was looking for international support to strengthen his 
power, which was similar to the situation faced by the PRC during the same period. The 
two countries quickly formed a relationship and planned a new Games, the GANEFO. 
Based on the announcement of the Sport Ministry of Indonesia, GANEFO was created 
for countries that resisted imperialists and colonists and would replace the Olympic 
Games that served the same western imperialists and colonists.79 Intended as a direct 
challenge to the Olympic Movement, the IOC immediately protested and declared no 
recognition for the Games. The PRC showed great interest in the GANEFO and provided 
Indonesia with US$18 million plus the transportation cost of all the delegations.80 Given 
that both Indonesia and the PRC saw the Olympic Games as a political tool helping 
western countries to dominate the world, the GANEFO was envisioned to become a 
political tool helping the newly independent countries to lead a new world. 
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The first GANEFO was held in Jakarta in November 1963. Although the 
GANEFO was held in Indonesia, the PRC played an important role in financial, 
diplomatic, and organizational support to ensure the Games were staged. More than 2,200 
athletes from 48 countries and regions competed throughout the games. To avoid being 
barred from the IOC, most of the participating countries such as the Soviet Union sent 
young athletes or student athletes to the Games.81 The PRC sent a delegation with 328 
athletes, officials and coaches, won 66 gold, 56 silver, and 46 bronze medals, and broke 
two world records. This was the first time that PRC athletes competed in an 
international sport event following its withdrawal from the IOC. Yet despite the 
competition, the games saw significant political interference. For example, during a 
Badminton match, the PRC sport minister ordered an athlete to lose the game to the 
Indonesia opponent at a point when the PRC athlete had a prominent lead in the match. 
The PRC athlete had to intentionally make many mistakes thereby losing the game.83 
Following the Games, a 36-member-country GANEFO Congress was established. The 
congress scheduled GANEFO II in 1967 in Cairo, Egypt.84 Moreover, and with the 
PRC's assistance, the Asian GANEFO was held in Cambodia in 1966, the same time the 
5th Asian Games were held in Bangkok, Thailand.85 More than 2,000 athletes from 17 
Asian countries competed at the Games. The PRC athletes won 113 gold, 59 silver, and 
36 bronze medals and broke two world records.8 Although the staging of the GANEFO 
did strengthen the influence of the PRC throughout the third world countries and offer a 
great stage to showcase its progress in sport in the 1960s, the GANEFO II was not held 
due to financial issues. Almost at the same time, the PRC tumbled into the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. The GANEFO soon disappeared silently because the main 
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proponent, the PRC, found itself in the center of an emerging political storm. The 
Cultural Revolution terminated all development in Mainland China and caused fanatic 
class struggles along with political persecutions. The PRC tried to use sport to enhance its 
political influence in the world but Chinese sport, like many other institutions that had 
developed, was destroyed by the political storm that accompanied the Cultural 
Revolution during the 1960s. 
When it came to the 1970s, international relations such as Sino-USSR and Sino-
US relations changed significantly. The military border clash between Chinese troops and 
Soviet troops broke out at Zhenbao Island in 1969, which accelerated the deterioration of 
Sino-USSR relations. In response, the PRC leadership attempted to improve their 
relationship with the United States. By doing this, it was believed that this would reduce 
the threat from the Soviet Union thereby balancing the strength among the three 
countries.87 Thus, the PRC government sent a series of rapprochement signals to the 
United States at the beginning of the 1970s. "Ping-Pong diplomacy" was one of these 
attempts. In March 1971, the PRC table tennis team was invited by Japan to compete at 
the World Table Tennis Championship. During the event, the American team was invited 
by the Chinese delegation to visit China after the games. The American team accepted the 
invitation and went to China in April 1971.88 Following what was considered a successful 
visit, the Chinese team was invited immediately to the United States. The diplomatic door 
between the United States and the PRC was opened unexpectedly by sport.89 The visits 
between the government officials of both countries occurred right after the table-tennis 
teams visit. "Ping-Pong diplomacy" also paved the way for the PRC's admission into the 
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United Nations (U.N.).90 In October 1971 the U.N. recognized the PRC, expelled Taiwan 
from the Security Council and gave the seat to the PRC.91 
The PRC's reinstatement by the U.N. provided the IOC with a welcome precedent. 
In addition, the situation also changed within the membership of the IOC. Some IOC 
members visited China in 1971 and raised the question of the PRC's status at the IOC 
Session in September 1971. The suggestion was made following the session: all 
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) were welcomed as long as they conformed to the 
IOC rules.93 The suggestion signaled an attitude change among the IOC members 
regarding the China issue. In 1972, Lord Killanin took over the presidency of the IOC. 
With work experience in China and a different management style than Brundage,94 Lord 
Killanin worked to solve the "two Chinas" issue as soon as possible. In September 1972 
the Asian Games Federation recognized the PRC's membership and revoked Taiwan's 
membership. This decision can be attributed to the significant efforts of the PRC, Iran, 
and Japan.95 Iran, the host of the 7th Asian Games, expressed a desire to invite the PRC 
athletes to attend. The Japanese Olympic Committee also persuaded ISFs and NOCs to 
recognize the PRC's membership. In November 1973 with a vote of 38 to 13, the PRC 
was admitted and Taiwan was expelled in the Asian Games Council, which meant the 
PRC would replace Taiwan and attend the 7th Asian Games.96 Taiwan lost its 
qualification to compete at the Asian Games until the 1990 Beijing Asian Games. 
Although the Taiwan representatives protested both in the Asian Games Council and the 
IOC, the decisions did not change in either of them.98 
The Chinese delegation competed successfully at the Asian Games in 1974. They 
won 32 gold, 44 silver, and 26 bronze medals, ranking them second place on the tally 
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right behind the Japanese delegation." Following the success in Iran, the PRC formally 
applied for recognition at the IOC Session in Lausanne on 9 April 1975, although still 
with the condition that the Taiwan membership should be revoked.100 Following highly 
heated discussions, in May 1975 a decision was made: the information that was used to 
decide the PRC's recognition would be insufficient until an IOC delegation visited 
China.101 The visit of President Killanin did not happen until 1977.102 Given the unsolved 
situation, the "two Chinas" issue erupted again during the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. 
The Canadian government had followed a "One-China" policy following the PRC return 
to the U.N.103 When Beijing asked the Canadians to block the Taiwan delegation from 
competing at the Games in Montreal, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau agreed and 
refused entry to the Taiwanese.104 The IOC and the United States protested, while the 
Canadian government refused to change its stance. Lord Killanin chose to negotiate with 
the Canadians rather than cancel or move the Games from Montreal. Finally, both 
Trudeau and Lord Killanin compromised, announcing that Taiwan athletes could compete 
but under the name of Taiwan.105 Although Taiwan and the United States protested the 
decision and threatened that they would withdraw from the Games, the Canadian 
government refused to change their final decision. Eventually, the United States 
delegation competed as scheduled, while the Taiwan delegation boycotted, which 
resulted in no Chinese athletes at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games.106 
By the end of 1976 the Cultural Revolution, an unprecedented disaster in China, 
came to its end. With new leaders of the PRC taking over in 1978, the PRC began to 
carry out economic reform and more flexible international diplomatic strategies. 
Accompanied by a Japanese IOC member, Lord Killanin visited China in 1977, but no 
breakthrough occurred during this visit. Further, Lord Killanin assigned a three-
member committee to visit both China and Taiwan to collect relevant information for the 
IOC members and IOC Executive Board.108 More importantly, Juan Antonio Samaranch, 
the successor of Lord Killanin, suggested that the PRC should be recognized and the 
NOC of Taiwan should be asked to change the name, based on his visit to China in 1978 
during which he felt the importance of this vast country to the Olympic movement. 
Despite the fact that Lord Killanin failed to hold a meeting between the PRC and Taiwan 
representatives at the IOC session in Montevideo in April 1979, some signs of 
compromise began to appear in the session.110 He Zhengliang, a PRC representative, 
stated in the session that Taiwan athletes should have the right to compete at the Olympic 
Games as long as they are under the name of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee.111 
Following the heated discussion, the recognition of the PRC was approved by a vote of 
36 to 30. The PRC acquired the name of the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC); and 
Taiwan would not be allowed to use the same name.112 The issue of "Two Chinas" was 
finally settled in November 1979 with a postal vote of all IOC members. It was decided 
that the PRC's Olympic Committee would use the name of the Chinese Olympic 
Committee in its relations with the IOC and the ISFs with the flag and anthem of the 
PRC; the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee should use a different flag and anthem 
from those used at the time.113 Although the Taiwanese representative protested the 
decision and the government even boycotted the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic 
Games, the IOC's final resolution regarding the China issue has not been changed up to 
the present. 
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The Significance and the Purpose of the Study 
Chinese athletes have increasingly improved their performance in international 
competition. As a country with one of the fastest growing economies in the world, 
combined with the fact that Beijing hosted the 2008 Summer Olympiad, the Olympic 
Movement in China has seen significant attention academically by both Chinese and 
western scholars. Scholarly works have made a significant contribution to the academy 
within those disciplines investigating the Olympic Movement in China and Chinese sport 
development. These include, but are not limited to, national sport policies in China, 
Olympic economy in China, the interaction between politics and sport in an Olympic 
context, and domestic social alteration in China influenced by staging the 2008 
Olympiad. 
As another discipline contributing to Chinese Olympic studies, the history of the 
Olympic Movement in China and the development of modern sport in China have also 
attracted the attention of scholars. The research works that have been done in these areas 
mainly cover two periods: the first is when western sport and modern physical education 
were introduced into China following the Opium War in 1840 to the time when Chinese 
Olympic Committee of the People's Republic of China was recognized by the IOC in 
1979; the second is from the Chinese athletes' first appearance representing the COC at 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games to present. During these two periods, now 
exceeding one hundred years, we have seen attention given to the first Chinese athlete 
who competed in an Olympiad, the poor performance of Chinese athletes at the 1932 Los 
Angeles Olympiad through the 1948 London Olympiad, the "two Chinas" issue including 
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the emergence of the issue, the struggle between China and Taiwan and the final solution 
in 1979, and the successful performance of Chinese athletes at recent Olympiads. 
As one reviews these works, placing them on a chronological continuum, it 
becomes obvious that there is a period, from 1980 to 1984, during which few studies have 
focused their attention. Despite the fact that the COC was formally recognized by the 
IOC in 1979, they did not attend the 1980 Moscow Olympiad, deciding to boycott the 
Games thereby adopting the position advocated by the United States. At the time the 
relationship between the IOC and the PRC was vulnerable and sensitive. The COC sent a 
small delegation to Lake Placid to attend the 1980 Winter Olympic Games, although their 
attendance has not been identified as the "official" debut due, in part, to the poor 
performance of the Chinese athletes.114 Although most of the countries from the 
communism camp boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympiad, Chinese athletes attended, 
achieving excellent performances and thereby establishing a solid foundation upon which 
to build their future progress in the Olympic Games. 
What, why, and how it happened during this five-year period between 1980 and 
1984, an area where few previous works have focused, are the focus of this research 
study. To address the void, this study will investigate the historical facts regarding the 
development of the Olympic Movement and its sport policies in China during these five 
years. Moreover, this research will examine the shift in Chinese international relations 
especially with the Soviet Union and the United States. For both Chinese sport and other 
social domains, this shift connected the rivalry period with western nations from the 
1950s to the 1970s to the period of the post 1980s during which the economic reform and 
opening policies were implemented within China. It is the hope that this research 
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initiative will provide greater clarity and understanding of the development of the 
Olympic Movement in China during this period. Furthermore, it is the intent of the 
investigator as someone who, until recently, lived in China that the outcome of this 
research endeavour benefit scholars both inside China and the west by developing an 
objective perspective regarding Chinese Olympic history so readers can better examine 
and predict the ongoing development of the Olympic Movement in China. 
This study will focus on politics and international relations with a specific focus 
on the Olympic Movement in China during the period from the reinstatement of the COC 
by the IOC in November 1979 to the time the decision was made to participate in the Los 
Angeles Olympic Games in 1984. Specifically, the researcher will investigate the PRC 
government's reform of the national sport policies and the shifting attitudes related to the 
Olympic Movement in China between 1980 and 1984. Moreover, the factors both foreign 
and domestic that caused the shift will be examined. The purposes of this research are: 
(1) to investigate the development of the Olympic Movement in China following the 
COC's recognition by the IOC until its debut in the 1984 Summer Olympic Games; (2) to 
examine why the COC identified the Los Angeles Olympic Games to herald their return 
to the Olympic stage thus bypassing the Moscow Olympic Games; and (3) to examine 
how the decisions regarding both the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games and attendance 
at the 1984 Olympic Games were made. 
The Research Questions and the Hypotheses 
The Research Question of this Master's thesis project is as follows: 
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Why did the People's Republic of China choose the 1984 Los Angeles Summer 
Olympic Games instead of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games as the 
debut of the Chinese athletes on the global sport stage? 
To satisfy this research objective and develop a contextual understanding of the topic 
area, four sub-questions were addressed. These include: 
1. How did the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China evolve between the 1950s and the 1970s? 
2. How did the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic 
of China evolve between the 1950s and the 1970s? 
3. What were the political, ideological, and domestic sport realities in the 
People's Republic of China that affected the decisions regarding participation 
in Moscow and Los Angeles Olympiads between the second half of the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s? 
4. How were the decisions regarding both the boycott for the Moscow Olympic 
Games in 1980 and participation in the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1984 
made by the People's Republic of China government? 
Reviewing relevant works and responding to the research questions listed above, as a 
guide to the study, three main hypotheses have been identified as follows: 
HI: The PRC boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and participated in the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games because Sino-Soviet Union Relations were getting 
worse during the 1960s and the 1970s; the boycott was the consequence of the 
deteriorated Sino-USSR Relations 
H2: The PRC boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and participated in the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games because Sino-US Relations significantly improved 
during the 1970s; the participation was intended as a signal to express the PRC's positive 
attitude toward this relationship. 
H3: The PRC boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and participated in the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games because when the COC was reinstated by the IOC in 
1979, Chinese athletes' overall sport performance were not high enough to compete with 
world standards players; to achieve and maintain national glory, the PRC did not want to 
risk a poor performance at the Summer Olympic Games in 1980. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
The response to the research question consists of a range of historical facts, 
including the Olympic Movement during the Cold War period (especially from the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the beginning of the 1980s), international relations 
around the PRC, and the PRC's domestic circumstances after Mao's era.1 To establish a 
substantial foundation and provide a relevant background for this research initiative, four 
sections of literature are categorized and reviewed: (1) The Cold War and the Olympic 
Movement; (2) Sino-Soviet Relations, 1950s - 1970s; (3) Sino-American Relations, 
1950s - 1970s; and (4) Domestic reform after Mao's era. Each of the identified sections is 
germane to this research initiative. 
The Cold War and the Olympic Movement 
Following the celebration of victory of World War II in 1945, Berlin was 
separated and controlled by the Soviet Union and the western allies. The west side of the 
city was occupied by the United States of America (USA), Britain, and French troops, 
while the east side was occupied by troops from the Soviet Union. The split in Berlin 
symbolized the development of a bi-polar world. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union 
and the USA, gradually confronted each other and ultimately aggravated into a position 
of relentless hostility, which has been characterized as the Cold War and lasted for the 
next four decades.2 Unlike a conventional battle, the Cold War expressed a state of 
hostility, extreme unfriendliness, political pressure and threats, and military rivalry 
between those countries aligned with the Soviet Union and those aligned with the USA 
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due to the different ideologies held up by both sides following World War II. Simply 
stated, this was a confrontation between the communist and capitalist. The governments 
of the Soviet Union and most of the eastern European countries espoused Communism 
and the fact that it would replace Capitalism throughout the world, while the USA and 
most of the western European countries believed in Capitalism by which democracy and 
liberty would develop. The bi-polar situation was the mainstream all over the world 
during the Cold War period. Each side alleged what they believed in was right and 
superior, whereas what the other side believed in was unquestionably wrong and inferior. 
Rather than a real war involving conventional combat in a battlefield, the rivalries 
penetrated into every aspect of society, including but not limited to, culture, education, 
the media, military, and science. Consequentially, these rivalries served national interest 
of each of the two superpowers. 
Throughout this period, sport, as a critical component of society, was not 
separated from the rivalry between the two superpowers but instead a quite important 
means used by both sides.4 If sport can be described as a political weapon, the Olympic 
Games provided the biggest battlefields in which this weapon could be used. Although 
the IOC alleged that politics had nothing to do with sport and the IOC would never 
tolerate any political interference, it was inevitable that the Olympic Games during the 
Cold War era were always used as a political stage on which the two superpowers 
attempted to show their superiority at all cost.5 The significance of the Olympic Games 
was distorted by the rivalry between those representing communism and capitalism. 
Athletes, the media, and even spectators from both sides, were used to realize the 
respective political purpose. Issues such as drug abuse, military personnel and 
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professional athletes,6 and boycott and political intervention, filled international sport, 
which violated the Olympic Movement during the Cold War period. According to 
Guttmann, the rivalry in sport between the USA and the Soviet Union was one of the 
most dramatic aspects of the modern Olympic Games from 1952 when the Soviet Union 
first participated in the Olympic Games to the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, which is 
recognized as the last Olympiad staged during the Cold War era. Guttmann stated that 
there was a generally accepted perception that the Olympic Games were an extension of 
politics by other means. In addition, on the Soviet side, athletic triumphs over the 
capitalist nations became an officially recognized goal and each victory by Soviet athletes 
was heralded as a sign of ideological superiority, while on the other side, Guttmann did 
not think it became an official goal, even though athletes from western countries who 
won over their Soviet competitors were highly praised.8 
Soviet leaders only sent a small observer group to the 1948 Olympic Games in 
London to see whether Soviet athletes would be successful if they were to take part in the 
1952 Games.9 For the Soviet Union, they had to secure victory because any failure would 
discredit the country.10 As a Soviet spokesman expressed, "Each new victory provides 
irrefutable proof of the superiority of Soviet culture over the decaying culture of the 
capitalist states."11 Success during the Games was a must and each victory served the 
national interest of the Soviet Union. Following a 40-year absence from the Olympic 
Movement, Soviet athletes re-entered the Olympic community at the 1952 Helsinki 
Olympic Games. Compared to the influences and interventions from the superpowers, 
the apolitical characteristics of the Olympic Games was weak. Avery Brundage, President 
of the IOC at the time, commented prior to the 1952 Olympic Games that "since for the 
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first time these games will provide a direct comparison between our boys and girls and 
those from Communism world, it is essential that we send our best and strongest team to 
the Olympic Games."13 The comment expressed that even IOC President Avery Brundage 
had ideologically separated the nations into two camps. Consequentially, the 1952 
Olympic Games saw the Cold War extend itself onto the sport field and the political 
factors and motives became the main driving force for the competition between the 
Soviet Union bloc and the USA led western countries.14 According to Guttmann, 
although a point system was not approved by the IOC, it is generally agreed that the USA 
won the competition at the 1952 and 1968 Summer Olympic Games while the Soviet 
Union won the remainder between 1952 and 1976.15 When it comes to the Winter 
Olympic Games, the Soviet Union made its debut at the 1956 Winter Olympic Games in 
Cortina, achieving first place in the medal count; since then they finished in first place at 
all the Winter Olympic Games between 1956 and 1976, except for 1968 when Norway 
defeated them.16 
In addition to the direct competitions between the two superpowers, there were 
indirect confrontations between the two different ideological camps. The "two 
Germanys" issue was a typical example. The IOC fully recognized the Federal Republic 
of Germany (FRG, West Germany) in 1951 following its establishment in 1949. Since 
East Germany was not a independent state at the time, it was not recognized by the IOC 
until 1955, the year following the Soviet Union's release of East Germany from its status 
as the Soviet Zone in Germany.17 Although the IOC hoped the athletes from East 
Germany would join the existing German team, East German officials refused to do so. 
As a result, the athletes competing for the German Olympic team during the Games in 
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Helsinki were all from West Germany. Thus, East German athletes did not compete in the 
Olympic Games in 1952. 
Although the IOC provisionally recognized the NOC of East Germany in 1955 
thereby creating two NOCs in Germany, their significant effort saw a joint team 
participating in the Olympic Games in 1956. The joint team used the black-red-gold flag 
of Weimar Republic19 with the Olympic rings as their flag and the last movement of 
Beethoven's 9th Symphony as the anthems when they entered the Opening Ceremony.20 
Although East Germany had modified their national flags by the 1960 Olympic Games in 
Rome, the IOC-designed flags for the joint team did not change.21 The joint team lasted 
for three Olympiads between 1956 and 1964.22 Although Avery Brundage stated that the 
IOC had made significant strides on reunifying Germany on the sport field, which 
politicians had failed to achieve, the joint team did not last beyond the 1964 Olympic 
Games.23 
Strongly influenced by the two superpowers during the 1960s, both Germanys 
continued to ask for the separation of Olympic teams. East Germany wanted to be 
recognized formally by the IOC, while West Germany was also beginning to ask for a 
separate team. In addition, twenty out of twenty-four ISFs demanded separated teams for 
the two German regions during the 1960s. The International Amateur Athletic Federation 
(IAAF) allowed separated German teams to participate in the European Championships 
in 1966.24 The IOC, in 1965, agreed by a large majority that East Germany would create 
their own Olympic team for the 1968 Olympic Games.25 
In addition to the competition between the two superpowers and the issue of the 
"two Germanys," there were many other conflicts caused by the Cold War at the Olympic 
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Games. At the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, Switzerland, Spain and the Netherlands 
did not attend to protest the invasion in Hungary by Soviet troops; while Egypt, Iraq and 
Lebanon did not attend to protest the invasion in Egypt by Israeli troops.26 Prior to the 
1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, the South African Olympic team was banned from the 
Games because of its domestic apartheid policy.27 At the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games, 
the American Sprinters, Tommie Smith and John Carlos, protested the policy of their 
government while on the Podium to support the American Civil Rights Movement at the 
time.28 The 1972 Munich Olympic Games saw Israeli athletes seized and eventually 
killed by Palestinian terrorists due to the religious and political conflicts between the two 
sides. Twenty-six nations boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, due to the fact 
that New Zealand had been allowed to participate in the Games even though its rugby 
i n 
team competed with South Africa. Although not all aforementioned events can be 
directly attributed to the Cold War, it was quite obvious that the Olympic Games were 
used as an efficient means by which people could protest and punish enemies or support 
partners who were engaged in a political struggle. It was undeniable that political 
functions became new features of the Olympic Games during the Cold War era, which 
could be used by any nations who attempted to express political attitudes in the Olympic 
arena. 
The PRC re-entered the Olympic community at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
same time the boycotts at the Moscow and Los Angeles Olympic Games happened, 
which were seen as a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. To appropriately 
cope with the boycotts, the Chinese Government considered not only the factors in the 
sport domain, but also the factors in the international political domain, especially their 
43 
relations with the two superpowers. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an 
understanding of Sino-Soviet Relations and Sino-American Relations from 1950s to 
1970s. 
Sino-Soviet Relations, 1950s - 1970s 
Following the victory over Hitlerite Germany in May 1945, the Soviet Union had 
transferred a significant portion of its military forces to the Far East and, on 8 August 
1945, the Soviet government declared a state of war with Japan. Although there is still no 
conclusion regarding which was the final cause of the Japanese militarists' surrender, the 
Unites States' Atomic bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or the involvement of 
the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, by doing the latter the Soviet Union fulfilled 
the promise they made at the Yalta Conference that they would help liberate China 
thereby removing the armed forces from the Japanese. Soviet Troops swiftly entered 
China from the north and overwhelmingly destroyed the Guandong Army, the Japanese 
troops who were stationed in northeast China, in less than twenty days.32 Given that 
Soviet troops occupied the northeast part of China following the formal surrender of 
Japan by its Emperor in August 1945, the Soviet Union took advantage of the occupation 
to negotiate with both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist 
(Kuomintang) in order to achieve its maximum benefits in China.33 The Soviet Union 
signed the Treaty of Friendships and Union with the Kuomintang in August 1945 by 
which the Soviet Union expressed that they would provide the Kuomintang rather than 
the CCP with direct assistance to restore the country.34 Following the Civil War between 
the CCP and the Kuomintang which broke out in 1947, the Soviet Union realized that the 
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Kuomintang had become an agent of the USA, which would breach its benefit in China. 
Moreover, it soon became obvious that the CCP would win.35 As a result, the Soviet 
Union changed its strategy and provided aid to the CCP at the end of the 1940s. The CCP 
understood that it desperately needed support from the international communist 
community for its new regime. Therefore, when the PRC was established in October 
1949, Sino-Soviet Relations were cooperative and supportive. 
Shortly after the establishment of the PRC, the Soviet Union formally recognized 
the new regime. Sequentially, during the following decade, the Soviet Union gave the 
PRC all possible military, technical, and financial help. According to Sheng, the Soviet 
Union thought if socialism was victorious in China and other communism countries, then 
victory of socialism throughout the world would be virtually secured. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union needed support from communist China to become the leader of world 
Communism.37 In addition, from the Soviet perspective, supporting the PRC could create 
an eastern defense to confront Kuomintang, the agent of the USA, because the USA had 
already created military forces in Japan. From the Chinese perspective, Mao Zedong, the 
first leader of the PRC, understood the value of Soviet support in their ongoing struggle 
for power and the effort to consolidate the new regime.38 In Mao Zedong's work, On 
People's Democratic Dictatorship, he stated that there were only two routes the Chinese 
people could choose, imperialism or socialism; there was no other way to go. The 
Chinese people, he argued, must select one of them. Based on the situation in China at the 
time, the Chinese people selected socialism thereby following the Soviet Union. 
The new Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the 
Soviet Union and the PRC was signed in February 1950. The Treaty outlined the return of 
the Chinese-Changchun railway to the PRC by the end of 1952 and the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Northeast China by 1955.40 In addition, control of Port Lv Shun and 
Port Da Lian were returned at the same time.41 To assist with the restoration of China, the 
Soviet Union granted the PRC government a credit in the sum of $300 million over a 
five-year period (1950-1954). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would deliver the PRC 
equipment and materials for electric stations, metallurgical and machine building plants, 
coal mines, rail and road transportation, and other branches of economy in China.42 
Commenting on the Treaty, Mao Zedong said it was not only a tremendous help in 
building the new China, but also a strong guarantee in the struggle against aggression and 
for the preservation of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world.43 
Both Russian and Chinese scholars accept that the significance of the Treaty was highly 
important for the PRC to reconstruct the country.44 
The Korean War broke out in June 1950 when troops from North Korea began a 
military attack on South Korea. Although the North Korean leader received permission 
from both the Soviet Union and the PRC prior to the war, the PRC government did not 
receive any specific information on the war until it broke out.45 Considering the 
relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea and the border threat brought by 
the US-led multi-nation troops, Mao Zedong decided to provide North Korea with 
military aids in October 1950, although he was reluctant to send military troops to 
Korea.46 Throughout the war (1950 - 1953), there was close military collaboration 
between the PRC and the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union could not become 
involved in the war directly, it provided the Chinese army with a continuous supply of 
weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, and medicine. Soviet advisors, including military 
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leaders, were sent to Korea; and the Soviet Air Forces wearing Chinese military uniforms 
participated in the defense over the China-Korea border.47 With the existing alliance, 
during the first half of 1950s, the PRC helped the Soviet Union to fulfill the promise it 
made to support North Korea and, the Soviet Union supported the PRC militarily not 
only during the Korean War but also in its ongoing national defense. 
The Moscow-Beijing alliance during the first half of 1950s was largely created by 
two iron-hand leaders, Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin (1879-1953).48 The friendly 
relationship between the two countries did not change immediately following the death of 
Stalin in 1953. Five days after the death of Stalin, Pravda, the official newspaper of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, released a picture showing Stalin, Mao Zedong, 
and Georgi Malenkov (1902-1988) together.49 It expressed that the Soviet Union would 
continue most of the policies with the PRC established during the Stalin era. However, 
several months later, the leadership within the party changed dramatically. Nikita 
Khrushchev replaced Malenkov, becoming the successor of Stalin. Despite Khrushchev's 
revision of the national policies of the Soviet Union, Sino-Soviet Relations was 
maintained between 1953 and 1958. Li Fuchun, Chairman of China's State Planning 
Commission, when commenting on the First Five-Year Plan for Development of the 
National Economy of the PRC (1953-1957), indicated that Soviet aid played an important 
part to enable the Chinese people to carry out restoration work on a large scale with high 
speed and on an advanced technical level.50 It is generally accepted by scholars that 
during the Five-year Plan Sino-Soviet Relations had reached its peak and then it 
decreased dramatically.51 
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In February 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech brought out the 
path of de-Stalinisation, which could not be accepted by the CCP leaders, in particular, 
Mao Zedong. The CCP did not think it was necessary and correct that the Soviet Union 
should reevaluate Stalin. Further, the CCP was unwilling to accept Khrushchev's reforms 
relative to both its foreign and domestic policies. In Mao Zedong's view, the Soviet 
Union was turning revisionist in a way that deviated from the course of the International 
Communism movement.52 Mao Zedong criticized Khrushchev's reforms indirectly in 
1957, which led to the argument between the two parties increasing quickly.53 In the 
summer of 1958, Khrushchev suggested that the Soviet Union should build a long wave 
radio station in China and combine its fleet with the Chinese navy. The CCP refused his 
suggestion, categorizing them as an attempted violation of Chinese sovereignty.54 Also in 
1958, the Sino-Soviet disagreement on the "Great Leap Forward (GLF)"55 initiated by 
Mao Zedong increased the misunderstanding. It was Mao Zedong' opinion that China had 
already achieved enough power to develop independently and could catch up with their 
"elder brother," the Soviet Union, possibly even surpass them with the GLF.56 The Soviet 
Union doubted that the GLF was the correct method that socialist countries should follow. 
Khrushchev publicly criticized the CCP in respect to the GLF and the different foreign 
and domestic policies in 1959. In response to the criticism, Mao Zedong stated that 
Khrushchev was not a real Marxist and his naive policies regarding international and 
domestic relations would lead international Communism in the wrong direction. 
Following Mao Zedong's statement, Khrushchev complained that the PRC was 
aggressive and always ready to fight.58 Sequentially, numerous debates on policy and 
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ideology from both sides started at the beginning of the 1960s. No one compromised and 
both parties tried their best to convince the other. The Sino-Soviet alliance saw itself 
pushed toward a dangerous edge. 
The dispute between the two parties expanded from a debate limited to 
ideological values to one of national policy, involving issues of economic and technical 
cooperation. As a result, Sino-Soviet Relations finally shifted from cooperation to 
confrontation. The Soviet Union recalled more than 10,000 advisers and experts from 
China and stopped all aid projects and economic cooperation contracts in China at the 
beginning of the 1960s.59 Khrushchev attempted twice to organize an international 
meeting of the world Communist parties to isolate the PRC. The Soviet Union's policy of 
sanction and isolation to the PRC led to a period of hardship for three years in China 
between 1960 and 1962.60 
In October 1964, Khrushchev was replaced by his successor, Leonid Brezhnev 
(1906-1982). The dissension between the two parties did not disappear with the end of 
the Khrushchev era but extended to military conflict during the Brezhnev era. In 1964, 
the PRC stopped the talks with the Soviet Union because a drunken Soviet Marshal 
instigated a coup d'etat to the Chinese delegation.61 In 1965, Brezhnev formally 
announced the split between the two parties. One year later, the Cultural Revolution 
broke out in China. One of the most important features of the Cultural Revolution was 
anti-Soviet revisionist.62 At this time, the Soviet Union was not seen as the "Elder 
Brother" of the Chinese people but the vicious enemy who was the most significant threat 
to the PRC in the region. As a result, the second half of the 1960s saw the Sino-Soviet 
border became increasingly tense. A number of small-scale skirmishes occurred at 
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various places along the borders. The PRC claimed that there were a total of 4,189 border 
incidents prior to the serious clash of March 1969.63 According to Goldstein, the clash on 
the Ussuri River in 1969 between the PRC and the Soviet Union was initiated by PRC.64 
In March 1969, Chinese forces ambushed Soviet troops on ZhenBao Island, one of the 
larger islands along the Ussuri River. Soviet casualties numbered thirty-one dead and 
fourteen wounded in the two-hour battle, a death total far higher than any previous 
skirmish.65 Following the ZhenBao Island clash, Sino-Soviet Relations became extremely 
tense throughout the 1970s. Along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders, the 
Soviet Union increased its military equipment and stationed up to one million troops. 
They also deployed short-range missiles along the borders; based on Yang, during the 
1970s, one third of the total Soviet missiles were deployed along the Sino-Soviet and 
Sino-Mongolian borders. 
Throughout the Brezhnev era, Sino-Soviet Relations can be identified as hostile, 
tense, and full of confrontation. During the 1970s, the PRC realized that the threat from 
the Soviet Union had dramatically increased, resulting in the PRC government 
desperately seeking a way out of what they considered an unsafe situation. 
Sino-American Relations, 1950s - 1970s 
The development of Sino-American Relations between the 1950s and 1970s was 
opposite to the relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union. Influenced by the 
international diplomatic policies of the Soviet Union and the ideological divarication with 
western countries, in the 1950s and 1960s the PRC adopted an essentially hostile 
relationship with most of the western countries. When it came to the 1970s, the PRC 
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abandoned its hostile foreign policy toward the West and started to develop economic, 
cultural, educational, scientific, and diplomatic ties with the USA, certain European 
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countries, and Japan. On the other hand, the USA considered the PRC as a threat from 
the Far East in the 1950s and 1960s. With the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance at the 
end of the 1960s, the USA felt that it was the right time to develop a relationship with the 
PRC thereby further threatening the Soviet Union from the Far East. 
When the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan and occupied the island to continue their 
reign following the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan Island became a front line through which 
not only the CCP and the Kuomintang but also the two superpowers engaged in military 
conflicts, political propaganda, and espionage. The PRC, militarily supported by the 
Soviet Union, wanted to liberate Taiwan while the Kuomintang, with secured military, 
economic and diplomatic support from the USA in the 1950s, vowed to recover mainland 
China.69 The USA fully supported the Kuomintang during the Civil War in China. 
However, they were disappointed by their defeat and thought that further support of the 
Kuomintang would be fruitless. Meanwhile, the "lean on one side" attitude during the 
war caused hostility from the CCP and pushed the CCP toward the Soviet Union.70 As a 
result, the USA shifted their position to neutral at the beginning of the 1950s. First, the 
US government avoided directly denouncing the CCP and its new regime.71 Second, they 
expressed that they would disengage and finally abandon the alliance with Kuomintang. 
Furthermore, the US government utilized the media to propagate the diminished Sino-
Soviet alliance thereby hoping the PRC would alienate itself from the Soviet Union.73 In 
February 1950, although the Sino-Soviet Alliance was signed, the United States still 
expressed that they would not intervene in the Taiwan issue.74 
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The turning point of Sino-American Relations was the Korean War in 1950. 
Although the Korean War was not initiated by the PRC or the United States, it resulted in 
the two countries being hostile to each other for the next two decades. The leader of 
North Korea at the time, Kim Il-Sung (1912-1994), initiated the war by crossing the 38 
parallel into South Korea at dawn on 25 June 1950. The leaders of the PRC were not 
notified of the invasion by the Soviet Union or North Korea, receiving the news from an 
article in an European newspaper.77 In 1950, Mao Zedong was of the opinion that the 
unification of China, that is, the "liberation" of Taiwan, was the most urgent action 
instead of assisting the invasion by North Korea.78 However, the involvement of the USA 
changed Mao Zedong's mind.79 Although Korea was not the most probable attack target, 
the US government was ready for a swift reaction to any attacks coming from Communist 
countries.80 Two days later on 27 June 1950, President Truman ordered the United States 
Seventh Fleet to defend Taiwan against attack by Communist forces from the PRC, 
which was considered a serious threat to the United States Forces in the Pacific area.81 
Truman also announced that the status of Taiwan must be re-evaluated thereby involving 
the US government once again in the civil war in China.82 In response, the PRC publicly 
denounced Truman's action. 
Responding to the incursion of North Korea troops, the United Nations (UN) 
made the decision of military intervention in Korea. In September 1950, the UN troops 
who were primarily US Marines, started the amphibious operation at Inchon, a seaside 
city at South Korea. Following the successful landing, they counterattacked the North 
Korea troops and drove them back to the 38 Parallel.83 On 7 October 1950 the US troops 
crossed the 38 Parallel and kept going towards the north.84 In response, the PRC's troops 
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entered North Korea on October 19 and the first battle between the PRC and the USA 
broke out on October 25.85 The following three years saw both sides engage each other 
bitterly around the 38 Parallel and both had serious casualties. The cease-fire agreement 
was finally signed by both sides in July 1953. Meanwhile, a demilitarized zone was 
created, which has now separated North and South Korea for more than 50 years. 
Despite the cease-fire agreement, the conflict between the PRC and the USA was 
not over. The Taiwan Strait crisis broke out in 1954 when PRC troops bombarded Jinmen 
Island to protest the USA's intervention.86 In 1955, during the Indochina War, though the 
PRC and the USA did not fight directly, both sides supported the agents in Vietnam to 
fight at battlefield. Entering the 1960s, the USA found itself in the Vietnam War, which 
lasted until the beginning of the 1970s.87 During the war, the PRC government fully aided 
North Vietnam in its struggle against the USA.88 During the 1950s and 1960s, the USA 
considered the PRC an adversary, imposing a full economic blockade against the PRC 
and creating a series of military bases around the PRC.89 However, when Sino-Soviet 
Relations deteriorated at the beginning of the 1960s, the PRC started to find ways to 
communicate with the USA in an effort to reduce the pressure from the Soviet Union. 
To successfully navigate between the superpowers, the PRC had to balance their 
attitudes, opinions, policies, and even ideology. As early as the mid-1950s, the PRC tried 
to break through the tense relations with the USA. Following the Korean War and the 
Taiwan Strait crisis, the PRC leaders realized that hostile bilateral relations with the USA 
should be changed in order to give PRC domestic reconstruction efforts a chance. 
Continuous wartime during the past five decades had damaged the country severely. Thus, 
the PRC attempted to initiate direct dialogue with the USA following the Korean War.90 
During the African-Asian Conference, which was also called the Bandung Conference in 
Indonesia in April 1955, Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the PRC, announced that the PRC 
would like to talk with the US government on how to ease the intense situation in the Far 
East, especially the situation at the Taiwan Strait.91 Mediated by the Indian and British 
governments, the USA responded in July 1955 indicating that both sides could have an 
ambassadorial talk in the near future. The first Sino-American ambassadorial level 
meeting was held in Geneva on 1 August 1955, providing the officials from both 
countries an opportunity to understand each other. Talks provided a channel by which 
both sides could explore various possibilities of breaking the deadlock, exchange views 
on focused issues, and schedule future private meetings.94 The talks lasted until 1970 and 
totaled 136 during the 15 year period.95 
During the initial meeting in 1955, both sides agreed that civilians from the two 
countries were entitled to return to their respective countries.96 They did not come to an 
agreement on the second proposal. The PRC did not agree to renounce the use of force to 
achieve political purpose because they believed that the USA was attempting to limit 
their ability for reunification of China.97 Neither the PRC nor the USA compromised on 
the issue of the Taiwan Strait, thereby leading to a deadlock and the cessation of talks 
until 1958 when the Taiwan Strait crisis broke out again. Both sides were unwilling to 
accept the proposal of the other side, thus ensuring that no progress would be achieved.98 
Although neither side had significant expectations for the talks, they still wanted to 
engage in a dialogue to seek any possible resolutions to the crisis rather than involving 
themselves in a war over the Taiwan Strait.99 In 1962, when the Kuomintang in Taiwan 
attempted to launch a counterattack on Mainland China, the two countries attained an 
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agreement that both sides would stop the war over the Taiwan Strait.100 Although the 
talks maintained a channel for communication between the two countries, the hostile 
relationship between the two did not subside during the 1960s. Furthermore, the 
involvement of American Forces in Vietnam as early as the mid-1960s led to 
considerable concern in the PRC, which resulted in Sino-America Relations becoming 
more complicated.101 
Following the long involvement in the Vietnam War, many American scholars 
started to re-think the USA's foreign policy, especially with Communist countries such as 
the PRC and the Soviet Union.102 Meanwhile, the existing rivalry between the two 
superpowers saw the Soviet Union become strong by carrying out its expanding policies 
from eastern Europe to the Far East, while the USA was weakened due to the burden of 
the Vietnam War. The US government attempted to finish the war by recalling its troops 
from Southeast Asia thereby concentrating on the challenge from the Soviet Union.103 At 
the same time, a series of bloody clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 indicated 
that the previously strong Sino-Soviet alliance no longer existed. The PRC, now isolated, 
desperately sought a way out of the situation in which they faced the Soviet Union's 
military challenges from the north and the USA's threat from the south. Therefore, when 
it came to the 1970s, the PRC was willing to form new relationship with the USA to cope 
with the Soviet threat while the USA was trying to salvage a political victory against the 
Soviet Union in Vietnam by associating itself with the PRC.104 Under these circumstances, 
both sides sought the same political goal and had the same national enemy, the Soviet 
Union. The PRC government and the Nixon administration both grasped this opportunity 
at the correct time. 
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The first step toward re-establishing Sino-American Relations was the proposal 
the PRC government made to ask the USA to resume ambassadorial-level talks on 26 
November 1968. The USA accepted the proposal three days later.105 The PRC made the 
second step toward rapprochement with the USA on 19 February 1969 by proposing an 
assessment of the international situation. The assessment concluded that the Sino-Soviet 
contradiction was greater than that between the PRC and the USA. It also suggested that 
Sino-American talks should resume to end the current stalemate as quickly as possible.1 
In July 1969, the USA canceled certain trade sanctions against China and relaxed 
limitations on travel to China. Later in January 1970, the Sino-American ambassadorial 
talks resumed.107 During this period, President Nixon also signaled his interest to improve 
relations with China through France, Pakistan, and Romania, while the PRC leaders 
positively improved its relations with Japan, west European countries, and all the Third 
World countries, in order to oppose the Soviet Union.109 In 1971, the table-tennis teams 
from both the PRC and the USA visited each other thereby opening new relations 
between the two countries. Then, later in the year, the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger 
secretly visited China. Partially influenced by improving relations with the USA, the PRC 
reinstated its legal position in the UN. In February 1972, President Nixon visited China 
and the first Sino-American summit was held. 
The Shanghai Communique was announced following the summit. It pledged 
that both countries should make efforts together to normalize bilateral relation and 
maintain security over the Asian-Pacific area. The Communique decreased the 
differences between the two countries and paved the road for further improvement. Based 
on the Communique, the cooperation regarding economics, education, sport and culture, 
between the two countries was dramatically improved. ' In 1975, President Gerald Ford 
(1913-2006) visited the PRC and had a meeting with PRC Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping 
(1904-1997). Despite President Ford's visit, his administration did not take further steps 
to improve Sino-American Relations as there were significant differences on the issue of 
Taiwan.112 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter engaged in normalizing Sino-American 
relations, because the US government believed that it would be beneficial to its position 
relative to the rivalry with the Soviet Union.113 As a result, on 1 January 1979, the two 
countries established official diplomatic relations and announced the Joint Communique 
on the Sino-American diplomatic relation.114 The Sino-American relationship reached its 
peak at the end of the 1970s, thereby paving the road for further cooperation between the 
two countries in the future. 
Domestic Reform after the Mao Era 
Mao Zedong died on 9 September 1976. The PRC switched to a new stage of its 
development without the chaos that some might expect following his death.115 As an iron 
hand leader, Mao Zedong's leadership significantly impacted the country. His successor, 
Hua Guofeng, followed Mao Zedong's policies and ideology, suggesting that the PRC 
must be consistent with what Mao Zedong had established because all of his words and 
behaviours were right.116 Since Hua Guofeng had no political opinion and insufficient 
power to control the country, he had to sway between the two sides: revolutionists and 
capitalists, who had been struggling during Mao's era.117 In October 1976, the capitalists 
within China convinced Hua Guofeng to arrest the leaders of the revolution movement, 
also known as the "Gang of Four," who argued for the continuation of the Cultural 
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Revolution. Although the Cultural Revolution had ceased following the death of Mao 
Zedong in 1976, there were no political or economic reforms carried out until 1978 
when Deng Xiaoping, the successor of Hua Guofeng, came into power. 
Following twenty-seven years of totalitarian control, Mao Zedong's leadership 
left behind a country with the largest population and one of the lowest living standards in 
the world.119 It was broadly realized that the country needed a new leader with the 
capability to lead the Chinese people while improving the quality of life for everyone in 
the country. At the end of 1978, on the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, 
Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the PRC, which was a turning point in China as it 
started to reevaluate the past and plan for the future. Deng Xiaoping initiated substantial 
restructuring of the CCP and state bureaucracy as well as large-scale economic reform 
throughout China.120 Rather than insisting that Mao Zedong's thoughts become the norm, 
Deng Xiaoping contended, "Practice is the only criterion of truth" and " Seek truth from 
facts."12' Such a statement was significant because it meant the CCP admitted that Mao 
Zedong was not completely right, which had not happened since the establishment of the 
PRC in 1949. Deng Xiaoping worked to alter the ideological foundation that the Chinese 
people believed and opened their minds to new ways of thinking. By doing so the 
Chinese people would be able to think and judge objectively. Freeing people's thoughts 
was considered the first step of the reform after Mao because free thoughts would inspire 
more reforms in other domains.122 
In 1978, when many people in China were still debating the class structure and 
politics, Deng Xiaoping stated that the economic reconstruction of the country was the 
most critical task of the time. He also emphasized that political structure and ideology 
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should serve the economic development of China. In keeping with Deng Xiaoping's 
public statement, the CCP shifted its emphasis from class struggle to economic 
development.123 To make China a powerful country by the year 2000, a national strategic 
goal was set in 1978: the Four Modernization - agriculture, industry, science and 
technology, and national defense.124 To accomplish these goals, two national policies 
were made: economic reform and an open door policy for the state. In terms of the 
economic reform, according to Harding, in agriculture, individual families were assigned 
state production quotas and allowed control over the disposal of any produce over the 
assigned quota; in industry, the state enterprises were allowed to retain a share of their 
profits and independently sell the part of their output that exceeded mandatory state 
quotas.125 As a result, a semi-market economy was developed at the end of the 1970s. 
Following the implementation of the economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping realized that the 
lack of investment would halt the development of the economy. Thus, he initiated the 
open door policy to attract foreign investment.126 To attract the investment from western 
countries, Deng Xiaoping improved the relationships with the USA, Japan, and some 
western European countries. 
In addition to the reforms in the economic and foreign relations domain, at the end 
of the 1970s, the trend had spread into every field throughout China including sport. 
Following the aforementioned "Ping-Pong" diplomacy, the development of Chinese 
national sport did not improve until after the reform.128 In 1978, a well prepared PRC 
delegation attended the eighth Asian Games in Bangkok.129 This time the PRC challenged 
Japan's dominant position in the Asian sport world. The Chinese athletes won 51 gold 
medals and finished the Games in second position right after Japan.130 Although the 
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performance of the Chinese athletes improved at the Bangkok Asian Games, the overall 
level of Asian sport was low comparing with the two superpowers (Appendix II). 
Therefore, following the formal return of China to the Olympic Movement in October 
1979, the reform of sport started in the PRC. The new sport policy, the Olympic strategy, 
was set: elite sport is the priority ensuring that the PRC would become a leader in sport 
by the end of the twentieth century.131 At the beginning of the 1980s, the sport 
administration system was reformed from a centralized structure into a multi-level and 
multi-channel system.132 Sequentially, selection and training systems correspondingly 
shifted. By carrying out these reforms, more elite athletes could be trained and swiftly 
delivered into national teams. Furthermore, sport science developed quickly, which 
resulted in the improved performance of Chinese elite athletes. These reforms did not 
show their effect until the 1982 Delhi Asian Games at which the Chinese athletes won 61 
gold, 51 silver, and 41 bronze medals, placing first in total medals received.133 The 
breakthrough at the 1982 Asian Games built a solid foundation upon which the Chinese 
athletes' future participation at the Olympic Games would be based. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
Direction of the Study 
The task of this research initiative is to investigate the development of the 
Olympic Movement in China from 1979 to 1984 and respond to the primary research 
question as to why the PRC sent the delegation to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games 
rather than the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. The author is attempting to portray a 
holistic and multidimensional description of the period identified, which is not only 
limited in the sport domain, but also extensively spread across the broader fields of 
international relations, the domestic actualities and the political functions of sport in 
China. Since the study involves numerous political analyses and discussions regarding 
international relations and ideological struggles during the Cold War era, the theoretical 
construct of social existence derived from Historical Materialism by Karl Marx has been 
utilized in shaping the direction of the study.1 
As one of the basic insights of Historical Materialism, it is argued that the history 
of human beings is not independent of the material conditions of existence. Thus, "it is 
not the consciousness of human beings that determines their existence, on the contrary, 
their social existence that determines their consciousness."2 When referring specifically 
to the Cold War era, the construct can be paraphrased to state that the ideologies and 
political structures dominating in different nations are determined by respective social 
realities including, but not limited to, social economics, stability, social wealth and 
prosperous level, and social norms and religious roots. These different ideologies 
partially resulted in political and military conflicts between the two superpowers as well 
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as their agent nations during the Cold War era, as each bloc sought to prove that their 
dominating ideology and political structure was better than their opponents. For the 
Soviet Union, the USA and the PRC, it can be argued that all the direct and indirect 
political and military conflicts and threats during the Cold War era were to protect their 
own ideologies and political interests thereby maintaining their dominance inside the 
respective nation and over the bloc. Under this philosophical direction, it can be 
concluded that during the Cold War era, material conditions and its objective existence 
determined ideologies; in turn, the dominated ideologies created driven forces and 
motives for the behaviours and actions in the political domain, economic domain, and 
even the sport domain. Therefore, due to sport's political functions, the participating or 
boycotting of the Olympic Games were utilized as a means to not only protect their own 
ideology but also to attack opponents' ideology thereby benefiting their own group 
interests. 
As a socialist country, the PRC undoubtedly had a different ideology from that 
found in the USA. However, to prevent common threats from the Soviet Union, both 
countries created a cooperative relationship in the 1970s. On the other hand, although 
both were socialist countries, the PRC went a different route from the Soviet Union. Each 
side attempted, but failed, to convince the other to follow the ideologies stemming from 
their own existence. This divergence finally led to the two countries confronting each 
other during the 1970s. In addition, the PRC experienced significant social 
transformations from the end of the 1970s to the first half of the 1980s.3 Thus, in 
summarizing these unique situations, the PRC would have their own social existence, 
which, in turn, would ideologically differentiate them from other socialist countries, and 
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drive the PRC with an exclusive political understanding and motives to make different 
decisions regarding the boycott of the Olympic Games in 1980 and the participation in 
1984. 
Although as a theoretical construct, the dialectic relation between existence and 
consciousness from Historical Materialism guides the study, the author is not attempting 
to paraphrase history with this theoretical construct. This dialectic relation acted as a 
constructive guideline throughout the investigation, thereby keeping it on a consistent 
path. Although it is understood and acknowledged that people cannot utilize theory to 
fully explain history, this research initiative was informed by this theoretical construct. 
Explanation of the Research Design 
Having such characteristics as the understanding and discovery investigation goal, 
small and nonrandom sample, researcher as primary instrument, and comprehensive and 
holistic findings, this study is qualitative reseach.4 Two primary methods of data 
collection, archival research and key actor interviews, were employed in this research 
study. Moreover, certain secondary sources, such as academic journal articles, 
newspapers, and historical books, both in English and Chinese, which provide a critical 
background to this study, were also investigated during the data collection. All 
information and historical facts associated with the Olympic Movement in China from 
1979 to 1984 were explored through these methods. The findings and conclusion of this 
research were placed in a broad historical and social context to see if they can support the 
hypotheses of the study (identified in the Introduction). 
The archival sources (primary sources) that have been utilized for this research 
are: (1) The Chinese National Sport Archives in the General Administration of Sport of 
China (Beijing, China); (2) The Chinese Olympic Committee Archives (Beijing, China); 
(3) The Archives in Beijing Sport University (Beijing, China); (4) China National Sport 
Museum (Beijing, China); (5) The States Archives Administration of the People's 
Republic of China; and (6) The Los Angeles Amateur Athletic Foundation 
(http://www.aafla.org) (Appendix XI). 
Face-to-face interviews with key actors who were involved in the decision-
making process were conducted as another main method of data collection. The list of 
names identified can be found in Appendix HI. The individuals include those who were 
in the position of responsibility at the Chinese Olympic Committee, the General 
Administration of Sport of China, and the All-China Sport Federation, along with other 
key actors related to the events and the decision-making at the time. Given the ongoing 
question-and-answer dialogue between researcher and respondent during face-to-face 
interviews, the interviews consisted of open-ended questions and structured questions 
thereby affording respondents an opportunity to provide information in a detailed and 
complete manner. The interview questionnaire is listed in Appendix IV. Since all the 
interviewees are Chinese, the Mandarin version of the questionnaire was also prepared 
and provided in Appendix V. 
To enhance validity and reliability of the information collected from these 
sources, the concept of triangulation was applied among the primary sources, secondary 
sources, and information collected from the interviews. Triangulation refers to the use of 
more than one source of data to support findings and conclusions, which offers strategies 
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for reducing bias and strengthening the findings of qualitative research.5 The information 
derived from the respondents can be called historical narratives or storytelling, which 
could be different depending on the different views of the events, precision of people's 
memory, and the level and degree to which people could be involved in the events. 
Therefore, the information from the respondents is less reliable unless they can be 
crosschecked with other data sources. Furthermore, the primary and secondary sources 
also need to be crosschecked with other sources. Those who compile and maintain 
archives live or lived in different times; they could be in different countries with different 
ideologies and opinions; thus, the researcher utilized more than one source to cross verify 
the information thereby ensuring the validity and reliability of study. 
Limitations 
Since the two primary methods of data collection are archival research and key 
actor interviews, the limitations of this study were generally limited to these two areas. 
Given the characteristics of this research study, most of the archives that were needed in 
this investigation are preserved in China. Therefore, geographical factors, accessible 
factors, and translation factors, limited this research initiative. Moreover, all the key 
actors who were involved in the decision-making regarding the Olympic Movement in 
China in the years under investigation (1979-1984) either live or lived in China; thus, 
geographical factors, accessible factors, and timing factors also limited this study relative 
to key actor interviews. 
As to the data collection during archival research, there are three aspects of 
limitations. First, the archives in respect to the development of the Olympic Movement in 
77 
China and the official records of the decision-making processes of participation in the 
Olympic Games in 1980 and 1984 were mostly held in the States Archives 
Administration of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese National Sport Archives 
Administration, the Archives of the General Administration of Sport, the National Sport 
Museum, and the China Sport University Archives administration. All these 
organizations, departments, and institutions are located in Beijing, China. Given that the 
author physically lives in North America combined with the limit on the time requirement 
for this research study, the distance limited sufficient and detailed investigation to some 
degree. Second, although the author did travel to these archives in China, a certain level 
of inaccessibility was experienced. The administration system of archives in China is 
under strict access controls. Chinese people who wish to browse and investigate any 
archives have to acquire certain permissions along with an eligible and officially accepted 
justification. Given the citizenship of the author, expectedly, the examination procedure 
and certifying process for obtaining access permission were more difficult and lengthy 
than that of Chinese citizens. Thus, it must be acknowledged that inaccessibility or semi-
accessibility did have a negative affect on this investigation's progress. Third, all archives 
located in China were recorded in Chinese characters, whereas this research initiative has 
been produced and defended in English. Thus, numerous archives in Chinese as well as a 
large number of secondary academic sources were translated into English. Although 
Chinese, as the author's first language, was employed fluently, the author acknowledges 
that the possibility of inaccurate translation of expressions and meanings can be one of 
the main limitations to the study. 
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As to the data collection from the key actor interviews, geographic proximity 
factors are also one of the limitations due to the fact that all the key actors live or lived in 
China. In addition, there are three other aspects that, to some extent, influenced the data 
collected during the interview process. First, unfortunately, some of the key actors who 
were deeply involved in the development of the Olympic Movement in China from 1979 
to 1984 have passed away. These individuals include: Zhong Shitong (1913-2001), the 
President of the China Olympic Committee (COC) from 1979 to 1985; Wang Meng 
(1920-2007), the Director of the General Administration of Sport of China between 1971 
and 1974 and between 1977 and 1981; Rong Gaotang (1912-2006), the Secretary General 
of General Administration of Sport of China, from 1974 to 1981; and Song Zhong (1923-
1989), the Secretary General of the COC from 1974 to 1980. These senior figures directly 
experienced China's return to the Olympic Movement and were involved in the decisions 
to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games and participate in the Los Angeles Olympic 
Games. Naturally, their memories would have been quite precious to this study. Second, 
most of the key actors the author identified in Appendix III are currently in a high 
position in the Chinese sport system. Included among these are He Zhengliang and Lv 
Shengrong, the Chinese IOC members. Thus, given their tight time schedules for the 
coming Beijing Olympic Games, expectedly, it was difficult to make a connection and 
schedule an interview with them, especially when the Beijing Olympic Games was in its 
final preparation phase. Therefore, inaccessibility to the key figures represents another 
limitation to the study. Third, it must be understood that this was a very special period for 
the Beijing Olympic Games. The PRC government, Chinese Sport administration as well 
as the Chinese Olympic Committee regarded the successful staging of the Olympic 
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Games as a national priority. Therefore, any voices and actions that may diminish the 
spectacular importance of the Beijing Olympic Games would not be tolerated. Given that 
the interview questions included topics such as boycotts and sports' political functions, 
which could touch the sensitive nerves of the PRC government, it was possible that 
certain identified interviewees declined to be interviewed or respond incorrectly because 
of it. Under this situation, the data results may, to some degree, distort or deviate thereby 
exerting influence on the study and consequentially breaching the validity and reliability 
of the conclusions. 
In addition, although the interview is undoubtedly the most common source of 
data in qualitative studies,6 given that the interviewees in this research were required to 
recall memories from a long time ago, it is inevitable that some of the responses may blur 
the facts or even be false. Although a cross check with other sources is an efficient way to 
enhance the reliability of the results,7 this kind of validation may not be possible due to 
the inaccessibility, which presented another limitations of this study. 
Delimitations 
Given the research questions presented in this study, a temporal boundary was 
established between 1980 and 1984, which means the investigation of the development of 
the Olympic Movement in China was delimited to this five-year period. Within this time 
range, only the events and historical facts that impacted the decision-making of the two 
Olympiads were considered. 
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979 and, the former president of 
the USA, Jimmy Carter, advocated the boycott at the beginning of 1980.8 Later in April 
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1980, the PRC government formally announced the boycott of the Moscow Olympic 
Games.9 Thus, most of the response and the decision-making the PRC government and 
Chinese sport administration made were within the period between January and April 
inl980.10 Therefore, the focus of the investigation relative to the 1980 Olympic Games 
was further delimited to this time period. In 1984, the PRC government announced that it 
would attend the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games prior to the Soviet Union's call for a 
boycott of the Games in May.11 Thus the focus of this investigation relative to the 1984 
Olympic Games was further delimited to the period between May and July in 1984. 
Although this study focuses on the descriptions of how the relative decisions were 
made, to investigate the thorough reasons for these decisions the development of Sino-
Soviet Relations and Sino-American Relations during the Cold War era were introduced. 
Given that ideological differences and political rivalries were the primary issues during 
the Cold War era, the analysis of this section has been limited to the political realm. It is 
argued that these influenced the PRC government's decision-making regarding the 
Olympic Games at the beginning of the 1980s. 
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Chapter Four 
Findings 
The following chapter examines what happened to Chinese national sport and the 
Olympic Movement in China during the five-year period (1980-1984).1 It is done by 
critically reviewing the PRC's foreign relations (specifically with the Soviet Union and 
the United States) during that period, the development and the reform of Chinese national 
sport at the time, and the participation of China at the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games. 
The chapter is chronologically divided into three sections: Section I: The First Year of the 
PRC's Reinstatement, 1980; Section II: The Development of Chinese National Sport 
1981-1983; and Section III: China's Preparation for the Los Angeles Summer Olympic 
Games, 1984. 
Section I: The First Year of the Reinstatement, 1980 
On 1 January 1979, the PRC and the USA established formal diplomatic relations. 
On the same day they announced the Sino-US Joint Communique thereby ending their 
strained relationship which had endured for much of the past three decades and heralding 
a new era of cooperation.2 For the next few years, this new couple experienced what can 
be described as their "honeymoon" period. The two countries increasingly strengthened 
relations and developed multi-aspect cooperation agreements during the time. "The 
improvement on Sino-US relations following the normalization was significant," 
American diplomat Henry Kissinger commented in 1980, "and the two countries would 
like to see more improvement and more cooperation in the future."3 The improvement 
saw the number of official visits between the two governments increase dramatically. 
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping went to the USA in January 1979 as the guest of 
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President Jimmy Carter; and Vice-President Walter Mondale visited China in August. 
Not only were visits held between the leaders, but also at all levels of government. 
Among the other Chinese visitors to the USA were Vice-Premier Fang Yi who was in 
charge of science, technology, and education; Vice-Premier Kang Shien who was in 
charge of economic affairs; and the Ministers of the petroleum industry, metallurgical 
industry, and finance and foreign trade. American visitors to China included American 
Secretaries of finance, commerce, health, education and welfare; and the Senators and 
Representatives who built communications between the two countries for foreign affairs, 
military affairs, administration, finance, trade, education, and labour.4 High level and 
frequent visits produced cooperation in various fields. For example, an agreement on 
scientific and technological cooperation was signed by Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter 
in 1979.5 In January 1980, Dr. Frank Press, the Science and Technology Advisor for the 
Carter administration, visited the Chinese Academy of Science in Beijing and signed the 
Report of the First Meeting of the Sino-US Joint Commission on Scientific Technological 
Co-operation.6 Moreover, the agreement on trade relations between the two countries 
came into force on 1 February 1980. Based on this Agreement, the two sides would 
"undertake to adopt all appropriate measures to create the most favourable conditions for 
strengthening, in all aspects, economic and trade relations between the two countries." 
More significantly, the first formal talk between military leaders of the two countries was 
held in January 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both sides found a 
broad spectrum of identical views on the international situation and agreed that the Soviet 
pursuance of hegemonism and expansionism was the main threat to the world.8 Both sides 
expressed that they would take parallel actions on the basis of equality and mutual benefit 
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in order to safeguard world peace.9 As Chinese Vice-Premier Geng Biao commented, 
Sino-US relations should set a long-term strategic goal in order to make efforts together 
to counter the Soviet hegemonism and expansionism.10 All these events indicated that 
both countries, in 1980, tried to maintain a constructive relationship for their own 
national interests and security. 
In contrast, Sino-Soviet relations in 1980 were tense due to consecutive border 
conflicts and the hostility between the two parties. Seeing the improving Sino-US 
relations, Soviet commentaries argued that China had begun to serve as an accomplice 
and junior partner in American imperialism's global strategy.11 On the other hand, the 
Chinese media described Soviet soldiers as unwelcome invaders who intruded into 
Chinese territory and killed Chinese civilians.12 In addition, Soviet military forces 
infiltrated Indochina, a move that was considered a serious threat to the southern border 
of the PRC. In the view of the PRC, the Soviet Union was providing Vietnam with 
military and financial aid against China.13 On 3 April 1979 the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
informed the Soviet Union that the PRC government would not extend the Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which would expire on 11 April 1980.1 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 
announced on 31 December 1979 that the government condemned the invasion and 
demanded that the Soviet authorities immediately stop their aggression and intervention 
in Afghanistan. They further demanded the withdrawal of their armed forces from that 
country.15 The announcement also stressed that Afghanistan was a neighbor of China, 
thus the Soviet armed invasion was seen as a considerable threat to the PRC's national 
security.16 In January the PRC government praised the countries that took various 
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measures to impose sanctions against the Soviet Union and expressed that the aggressors 
must be punished.17 PRC Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's Address, based on the PRC's 
perspective, fully described the Sino-Soviet-US triangle relationship during 1980. He 
stated that: 
China's view is consistent on the matter of global strategy. The Soviet 
Union is the main source of a turbulent international situation and a threat 
to peace and security. The policies of hegemonism and global 
expansionism pursued by the Soviet Union will not change because of one 
factor or another. All countries in the world should unite and deal 
seriously with the Soviet policy of global expansionism. China and the 
USA should do something in a down-to-earth way so as to defend world 
peace against Soviet hegemonism.18 
Despite the turbulent international environment surrounding the PRC in 1980, 
domestic reforms in various social aspects were carried out throughout China. Having 
suffered during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese People, along with the government 
attempted to address the existing domestic difficulties and reconstruct the country under 
new leadership with new ideology. The sport domain was no exception. Following the 
COC's reinstatement, the General Administration of Sport of China (GASC) shifted its 
working emphasis to the enhancement of the Chinese athletes' performance in Olympic 
sport events. On 12 March 1980 the GASC approved an official document, The 
Suggestions on Re-Arrangement of Sport £Venta.l9This document indicated that in 1980 
Chinese elite athletes belonged to thirty organizations throughout China covering forty-
three sports; among these, twenty-two were Olympic sports and twenty-one were not. 
Based on the document, officials noted that these twenty-two Olympic sports for which 
Chinese elite athletes trained could produce two-hundred and three Olympic gold medals. 
Among these Chinese elite athletes, 41.1 percent of them trained for only four sports: 
basketball, volleyball, soccer, and table tennis. However, these four sports could only 
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produce five Olympic gold medals (Table tennis was not the Olympic sports at the time). 
Thus, only 24.9 percent of the total complement of elite athletes in China trained for track 
and field, gymnastics, swimming, and weight-lifting, yet these four sports produced 
ninety-three Olympic gold medals, which was 45.8 percent of the total Olympic gold 
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medals produced from the sports Chinese elite athletes engaged in. Based on the 
statistical data, it was suggested that the current arrangement of Chinese national sport 
and athletes at the time was not helpful and practical to the production of medals at the 
Olympic Games. It was also suggested that the GASC and the COC should immediately 
adjust the arrangement of national sports based on the guideline shown in the document 
in order to make them more specific and efficient to enhance athletic performance. 
On 28 March 1980 the GASC approved another official document, The Report on 
Facilitating National Athletic Performance?2 In this document, the national goals for the 
next two Olympic Games were set: the position of the Chinese Olympic team must be in 
the top ten in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and top six in the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Games.23 The report indicated that although it was "highly possible" not to 
participate in the Moscow Olympic Games, athletes must make enough preparations for 
certain equivalent international sport events held in 1980.24 In addition, the document 
also provided a scheme for reforming the national sport training system. A three-level 
training and athletes delivery system was suggested. This new system placed the national 
level at the top, provincial level in the middle, and spare-time sport training schools and 
regular middle schools as the basic foundation.25 
On 12 May 1980 an academic conference regarding sport science was held in 
Chengdu, China.26 The significant importance of science and technology on sport was 
emphasized. According to a summary of the discussions and conclusions of the 
conference, sport science was neglected by both Chinese sport administration and 
coaches in the last three decades, which caused Chinese national sport to linger in a low 
level. The opinion, "Sport was not a scientific discipline," dominated the Chinese sport 
domain for a significant period.27 Therefore, Chinese sport scholars called on those 
within the sport training system to regard sport science as a guideline and a necessary 
means to achieve success. Applying new technology on sport, in their opinion, was the 
only way by which athletic performance could be enhanced and improved quickly.28 
Following the conference, the Association of the Science of Physical Education and 
Athletics was established in 1980.29 Furthermore, a relationship between the Chinese 
Association of Sports Medicine and the American College of Sports Medicine (ACSM) 
was established in 1980. This new relationship saw a number of ACSM scholars travel to 
China for exchange activities.30 
Despite the relatively short period of these reforms and adjustment in Chinese 
national sport, adequate improvement had been achieved during 1980. The achievements 
at various international competitions qualified Chinese athletes for a few events in the 
Moscow Olympic Games. The first gold medal at the World Gymnastics Championships 
(WGC) came from Ma Yanhong, a talented female gymnast who won the women's 
uneven bars event at the 20th WGC in the USA. During the competition, the Chinese 
women's and men's teams finished fourth and fifth respectively in the team events, 
qualifying them for the Moscow Olympic Games.31 In Addition, the Chinese men's 
basketball team won the gold medal at the 10th Asian Men's Basketball Championship in 
Nagoya, Japan. It would represent Asia in the Moscow Olympic basketball finals.32 The 
Chinese women's volleyball team won the championship title at the 2n Asian Women's 
Volleyball Championships in Hong Kong. They also won the right to represent Asia in 
the volleyball finals at the Moscow Olympic Games.33 On some non-Olympic events, 
Chinese athletes also attained success in 1980. Han Jian, a famous Chinese badminton 
player, defeated the Indonesian world champion in February in Singapore. The Chinese 
table tennis team won eleven Championships during 1980.34 In total, Chinese athletes 
broke seven world records including one Olympic event (men's 52 kg class weightlifting) 
during 1980.35 
Although the reform of China's national sport system had started, the Chinese 
athletes' level in many Olympic events was still below the world's best, especially in 
some popular sports such as track and field and swimming. The events that the Chinese 
athletes were good at were some non-Olympic sports such as table tennis and badminton, 
which developed well during the last three decades and had mass participation throughout 
China. In contrast, events such as track and field were developing slowly in China. Based 
on the statistical data from the Information Center at the GASC, the performance of 
Chinese athletes was far below the world top level athletes in 1980. For example, in 
men's discus, the best throw of the Chinese athletes was 57.58 m, while the world record 
was 71.16 m; in decathlon, the Chinese record was 7313 points while the world record 
was 8649 points; in men's long jump, the Chinese record was 7.95 m while the world 
record was 8.9 m; in men's 3000 m, the Chinese record was 8' 14"9 while the world 
record was 7'32"1; in women's javelin, the Chinese record was 59 m while the world 
record was 69.96 m; and in women's 400 m, the Chinese record was 55"08 while the 
world record was 48"60 (Appendix VI).36 The reasons for the low performance level 
89 
were mainly because: (1) the government and sport administration did not emphasize 
those sports and neglected elite athletes training in those sports; (2) there was no 
advanced coaching in China and the training techniques were still significantly behind 
that found in other states; (3) sport science and technology were not applied to these 
events; and (4) there was not enough financial aid to update and renovate training 
facilities and equipment.37 
Another thing that caused the Chinese sport administration to acknowledge the 
low level of China's national sport system was the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic 
Games.38 Following the COC's reinstatement in 1979, for the first time, the COC sent 
athletes to Lake Placid to participate in the 13th Winter Olympic Games. The Chinese 
delegation consisted of 28 athletes who competed in speed skating, figure skating, cross-
country skiing, and alpine skiing.39 Li Menghua, the Vice-President of the COC, 
commented that because this was the first time the PRC participated in the Olympic 
Games, it symbolized political significance.40 He also stated that the level and condition 
of Chinese winter sports were very low and the purpose of the participation was to learn 
from the world elite athletes and coaches.41 The result saw that there was not a single 
Chinese athlete in the position of top ten in any event. For example, in men's 1500 m 
speed skating, the Chinese athlete finished with 2'5"48 (no. 25) while the champion 
finished with 1'55"44; in the women's 1000 m speed skating, the Chinese athlete finished 
with 1'31"74 (no. 27) while the champion finished with 1 '24"10.42 The significant gap 
shocked Chinese sport leaders who later admitted that they had emphasized the politics of 
sport more than the athletic performance of its athletes in the past.43 Influenced by the 
poor performance during 1980, the PRC government formally approved a report on the 
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working emphasis which sought to improve athletic performance submitted by the 
GASC.44 Based on the Report, the working emphasis of the GASC would shift to athletic 
performance and competitive sports especially those found in the Olympic Games.45 
Although the strategic principles were approved in 1980, the GASC needed time to 
implement detailed projects and plans designed to bring the new strategies into effect. 
The PRC's boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games gave the Chinese national sport 
system a chance to reform and improve its athletic performance.4 
The PRC government initially decided to send athletes to participate in the 
Moscow Olympic Games. According to Wang Dinghua, a senior secretary at the GASC 
at the time, the GASC notified all provincial sport administrations in November 1979 to 
make sufficient preparation for the 1980 Olympic Games.47 The GASC held the national 
sport working conference in Beijing in July 1979.48 The representatives stated at the 
conference that the GASC should adjust its national sport strategy as quick as possible in 
order to improve athletic performance to meet the level of the Olympic Games. The 
conference also determined that all provincial sport committees must select elite athletes 
and prepare them for the 1980 Olympic Games. Furthermore, the conference set the goals 
for the Chinese athletes in the coming Olympic Games: position in top ten; fifteen medals; 
and five gold medals.49 The outcome of the conference and the GASC confirmed that 
winning at the coming Olympic Games had the highest priority over Chinese national 
sport in the next couple of years.50 The Olympic Games became the primary focus of the 
GASC; all work, therefore, was to serve that task.51 
Even prior to the decision of the PRC's reinstatement by the IOC, the COC had 
started preparations for the Moscow Olympic Games in 1979. On 20 October 1979, Song 
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Zhong, the General Secretary of the COC, stated at a news conference held in Tokyo that 
all the sport organizations in China had made detailed preparation plans for the 1980 
Olympic Games.52 The COC was reinstated by the IOC Executive Board in Nagoya, 
Japan, on 25 October 1979. The following day, Song Zhong stated again to the media 
that the COC would send athletes to both the Summer and Winter Olympic Games in 
1980.54 At the beginning of November, the COC held a Committee meeting discussing 
the decision of the IOC Executive Board in respect to the COC's reinstatement. The 
Committee required that all Chinese sports organizations and elite athletes must make 
sufficient preparations immediately for the 1980 Olympic Games.55 On 26 November 
1979, by a postal vote of 62 to 17, the Nagoya Decision was approved by all IOC 
members.56 The COC officially announced on 27 November 1979 that the PRC would 
attend both the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games and 1980 Moscow Olympic 
Games.57 At a reception hosted by the GASC for the celebration of the IOC recognition 
on November 28, Deng Yingchao (1904-1992), a CCP leader, stated that although the 
athletic performance of China may not "shock" the world, the Chinese athletes should 
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show Chinese sport spirit to the world at the 1980 [Moscow] Olympic Games. Based on 
the comments from Wang Dinghua, the decision of the PRC's participation was made by 
the PRC government and the Ministry of Foreign Affair of the PRC rather than the 
GASC and the COC.59 
Soviet military force invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. The PRC 
government released a quick response to this invasion. Shortly after the PRC government 
issued a statement strongly condemning the Soviet military invasion. It stated that the 
invasion violated all norms of international relations and caused a serious threat to peace 
and security in Asia and the whole world. The PRC government firmly demanded the 
full withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.61 Despite this statement, the 
decision to participate in the Moscow Olympic Games remained unchanged. COC 
President Zhong Shitong (1913-2001) was interviewed by The China Sports News at the 
beginning of January in 1980, and stated that Chinese athletes had been preparing for the 
Moscow Olympic Games since last year and they were expecting to compete in 
Moscow. On January 15, the Carter administration announced a boycott of the Moscow 
Olympic Games with a deadline of February 20 for the full withdrawal of Soviet ground 
troops from Afghanistan.63 According to Xing and Zu, in January, president Carter also 
wrote a letter to Hua Guofeng, the Chairman of the CCP, to persuade the PRC to boycott 
the Moscow Olympic Games.64 Almost at the same time, the Soviet media reported that 
the PRC had established a military base in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in China 
to train Afghan insurgents and it also assisted the Afghan resistance against the Soviet 
Union.65 Although the report proved a rumor, Sino-Soviet talks were terminated by the 
PRC government on January 20, which was considered a retaliatory response to the 
Soviet Union.66 On January 24, COC Vice President Li Menghua stated at a press 
conference in Tokyo that the proposal to boycott the Moscow Olympic Games or change 
the venue was reasonable. However, he also stated, 
The Chinese Olympic Committee is watching the developments concerning 
the boycott of the Summer Olympic Games and will take the stand of the 
majority of the Olympic committees of other countries. 7 
According to Wang Dinghua, Li Menghua was criticized by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affair of the PRC when he went back to China due to the statement he made in Tokyo. 
Given that the Ministry of Foreign Affair had already made the decision that the PRC 
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would not attend the Moscow Olympic Games, Li Menghua's Statement was not 
consistent with the final decision of the PRC government. Wang Meng (1920-2007), the 
supervisor of the GASC, explained to the Ministry of Foreign Affair that it was not Li 
Menghua's fault, because prior to his trip to Japan, the GASC had not internally 
announced the boycott decision. The Li Menghua incident brought to light two facts 
regarding Chinese national sport in the 1980s: (1) important decisions about national 
sports were made by the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affair; and (2) the 
GASC and Chinese national sport served both the political and national interests of 
China.69 
On January 30, as the head of the Chinese delegation for the 1980 Winter 
Olympic Games, Li Menghua changed his statement in Lake Placid. He indicated at a 
press conference that due to the invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow was not an appropriate 
location to host the Olympic Games.70 This time his statement was consistent with what 
the Ministry of Foreign Affair would indicate two days later. On February 1, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affair of the PRC formally announced that as long as the Soviet Union 
continued occupying Afghanistan, it was clearly inappropriate to hold the 22nd Summer 
Olympic Games in Moscow. The announcement also suggested that the IOC should 
transfer or cancel the Games. Finally, the Ministry stated that if the IOC failed to make 
such a decision, the PRC government would ask the COC to seriously consider staying 
away from the 22nd Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.71 On the same day, the GASC 
made its official announcement in which the government decision regarding the Moscow 
Olympic Games was completely supported.72 On February 12, at the IOC session in Lake 
Placid, it was determined that the 22nd Olympic Games would remain in Moscow. Also, 
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the deadline of May 24 was set for all national Olympic committees to decide if they 
would attend the Moscow Olympic Games.73 The US government ignored the IOC's 
deadline. On February 20, the American government announced that its athletes would 
not attend the Moscow Olympic Games because the Soviet Union did not remove its 
troops from Afghanistan prior to the established deadline of February 20.74 Almost two 
months later, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) made the decision of 
boycott on April 12 responding to the government's decision.75 In response to the 
USOC's boycott decision, on April 21, Chinese premier Hua Guofeng announced that 
attending the Moscow Olympic Games was inappropriate. One day later, the COC held 
a plenary meeting to determine the status of their attendance. After some initial debate, 
the decision to boycott the Games was approved by all members. However, the COC also 
determined that Chinese athletes would still attend if the Olympic Games were held out 
of the Soviet Union.77 This decision was final, and unless the location was changed, 
Chinese athletes would not have the opportunities to compete with top-level athletes at 
the 1980 Olympic Games. 
There are several reasons for China's boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. 
Based on the comments of Wu Shouzhang, the Vice-President of the COC in the 1980s, 
[in 1979] Soviet-supported Vietnam military forces put much stress on 
Chinese southern border and Soviet military forces threatened Chinese 
northern border for a long time, while the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
resulted in that Chinese western border was also directly threatened by -
Soviet military forces. Under this situation, China was besieged by the 
Soviet Union's military forces. Therefore, the [PRC] government must 
take actions to break the siege. The boycott of Moscow Olympic Games 
was an efficient way to express our protest and attitude.78 
He also stated that although the Chinese athletes were performing poorly at the time, they 
had a strong desire to compete for their country. Therefore, he denied that the boycott 
was because of the Chinese athletes' low-level performance. Wang Dinghua has the 
same opinion in respect to this point. He argues that the possibility that China gave up the 
Moscow Olympic Games because of the poor athletic performance of its athletes did not 
exist.80 Additionally, Pei Dongguang, a professor of Olympic Studies at the Capital 
Institute of Physical Education, expressed the same opinion. He commented that prior to 
1980 the Chinese athletes had not competed in the Olympic Games for a significant 
period and they had not achieved any Olympic medals. Attending the Olympic Games 
following the reinstatement symbolized more political meanings rather than the athletic 
meanings of Chinese national sport.81 Therefore, he stated, it is improbable that China's 
boycott was due to the poor athletic performance of its athletes at the time.82 Pei 
Dongguang stated another possible reason for the boycott. Based on his comments, Sino-
Soviet relations was not au pair; the Soviet Union always tried to dominate China while 
China resisted these efforts by the Soviet Union.83 The boycott expressed an attitude that 
the PRC government was not influenced or even controlled by the Soviet Union. Cui 
Lequan, the General Secretary of the Chinese Society of Sport History (CSSH), stated 
that between 1971 and 1979, the PRC government had been trying to improve the 
relationship with the USA. Following the normalization of Sino-US relations in 1979, a 
positive relationship had been dramatically developed. Both countries initiated a multi-
aspect cooperation agreement between 1979 and 1980. The boycott expressed that the 
PRC government wanted to further develop Sino-US relations in the 1980s.85 In addition, 
taking the same actions as the USA could also attain the rapprochement from western 
countries, which was needed for the PRC's restoration of international relations and 
domestic reconstruction.86 On the other hand, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, a 
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neighbor of China, which seriously threatened the PRC's national security. Furthermore, 
in January 1980, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev threatened that they might destroy the 
Chinese nuclear base so that the USA would have to maintain the cooperative 
relationship with the Soviet Union instead of protecting its "Chinese friends."87 Therefore, 
for the PRC, to boycott or not was a simple choice with a clear cause and effect.88 
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping publicly stated in 1980 that the enhanced 
relationship with the USA would become a long-term national strategy of the PRC; in 
addition, according to Deng Xiaoping, it was suggested that the USA, Japan, Western 
European countries, and the PRC should create an alliance against the Soviet Union in the 
1980s.89 
Section II: The Development of Chinese National Sport, 1981-1983 
The rapprochement and the cooperation between the PRC and the USA continued 
following President Ronald Reagan's election and his administration's move into the 
White House. On 16 March 1981 Secretary of State Haig stated on Sino-US relations that 
President Reagan visualized continued efforts to normalize the relationship with the PRC 
as this was considered a fundamental strategic reality and a strategic imperative. He 
also stated that it was of overriding importance to international stability and world 
peace.91 The PRC government agreed with Haig's statement and continued improving the 
cooperation with the US government while denouncing the Soviet invasion. In addition to 
protesting Soviet hegemonism and global expansionism, the PRC government realized 
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had an underlying economic purpose. The 
petroleum production in the Soviet Union had decreased since 1975.92 The Soviet Union, 
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it was argued, attempted to control the petroleum production in the Mid-East region while 
the invasion of Afghanistan was considered the first step of its ambition.93 The USA 
expressed the same concern: the Soviet invasion directly threatened its petroleum 
interests in the region.94 Under this situation and based on the same national interests, 
Sino-US economic relations quickly normalized between 1980 and 1981, a move that was 
considered vital in the fight against the Soviet Union's global expansion.95 The US 
Congress approved the Sino-US trade agreement in 1980 thereby granting the PRC most-
favoured-nation treatment. In September, the two countries signed agreements covering 
textile trade, maritime relations, and aviation relations. Total two-way trade increased in 
1980 to almost five billion dollars, more than double the 1979 figures.96 In addition, 
cooperation with those in the oil industry was also initiated. Twenty-one American oil 
firms submitted bids to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for the 
right to explore petroleum on China's southern continental shelf in 1982.97 As the PRC's 
domestic working emphasis had shifted to economic construction since the beginning of 
the 1980s, the PRC's foreign policy was thus placed in the service of the nation's 
economic development. From the PRC's perspective, it was stated that given the 
changed international environment, "the best way for a country to establish its influence 
in the world is not to bully its neighbours, but to turn itself into a more affluent and more 
democratic society by quick and high-quality economic development, sincere cooperation, 
and promoting international economic and cultural exchanges." 9 
Although Sino-US relations improved quickly at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
two countries still maintained respective independence ideologically and strategically. 
This independence resulted in the development of a number of tensions between the two 
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countries. In 1981, President Reagan approved the Taiwan Relations Act, continuing 
American sale of arms to Taiwan. He also suggested that American official relations with 
Taiwan might be established again.100 The PRC government protested and indicated that 
this was a retrogression and it violated the norms of international relations and 
encroached on the interests of the PRC.101 Foreign Minister Huang Hua announced on 
behalf of the PRC government that if the US government did not readjust their US-
Taiwan relations, Sino-US diplomatic relations would be adversely affected.102 The 
dispute was not partially resolved until 17 August 1982 with the announcement of the 
US- PRC Joint Communique (also known as "8.17 Communique"). Both sides agreed 
that the US government would not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to 
Taiwan; and its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed the level of those supplied during 
the years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA. 
In addition, the US government would seek to reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan.103 
Although the agreement was signed in 1982, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan was not 
completely solved in the 1980s.104 This issue made the PRC government further realize 
that in the 1980s the role of the USA in the world would still be one of the two 
superpowers and the PRC should temperately and cautiously develop bilateral 
cooperation with the US government.105 
In addition to the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, there were some sport-related 
issues that influenced the bilateral relations during those years including the Hu Na 
incident and the ARCO incident. Hu Na was a talented Chinese tennis player, who 
escaped from her team to the USA when a Chinese tennis team visited the country in July 
1982. Later in April 1983, the US government granted political asylum to Hu Na.106 
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There are many ways the US Immigration Service allows foreign citizens to attain 
permanent residence in the USA, but political asylum is the one that implies the 
individual has fled in fear of persecution.107 The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affair 
immediately issued a strong protest over the US government's decision and asserted that 
the decision would definitely impact the sport and cultural exchanges between the two 
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countries. It was also suggested that as long as Hu Na came back to China, she would 
represent China at future international tennis events without any persecution. Later, the 
PRC government notified the US government that the decision would be accepted if it 
was not under the name of political asylum. However, the notice was ignored by the US 
government.110 Under this situation, the Chinese government proclaimed that the PRC 
would never give up its sovereignty and national dignity to maintain Sino-US relations.111 
As a result, the Chinese government determined that a halt to all Sino-US sport and 
cultural exchanges would take place in 1983.m In another incident, ARCO (Atlantic 
Richfield Company), a sponsor of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, used a Taiwan 
national flag on its float during the Rose Bowl parade on New Year's Day, 1982.113 The 
PRC's embassy protested to the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) 
who replied that they had nothing to do with the incident.114 Later, the PRC government 
called a halt to ARCO's offshore drilling rights and kept the wells capped for several 
months until an appropriate apology was issued by ARCO.115 
Despite these incidents, the majority of the cooperation between the two countries 
was going well during the period. However, following these diplomatic incidents, the 
PRC's foreign policy became more independent and mutually beneficial than in 1980. 
The PRC government declared its stance as a non-alignment country. Toward the Soviet 
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Union, the PRC reduced its hostility and expressed an appropriate positive attitude to 
initiate a bilateral dialogue, while toward the USA, it reduced the passion and developed 
concrete and practical cooperation agreements. In the middle of the two superpowers, the 
PRC began to search for a balance to achieve its maximum national interests. In respect 
to the PRC's changed foreign policy to both the Soviet Union and the USA during the 
period, in 1984, Steven Golstein stated, 
[The PRC] would deal with each country as the merits of the situation 
required, condemning those acts which it found objectionable and 
supporting those positions with which China was in agreement, but 
always seeking to maintain some dialogue to improve bilateral 
relations,...the tactic was specifically named 'equidistance'."6 
The changed foreign policy served the PRC's domestic transformation. During this 
period, PRC leaders had already shifted its working emphasis to economic development 
(Appendix VII.). They attempted to provide the domestic reforms while achieving a 
peaceful and supportive international environment.117 
Deeply influenced by politics, Chinese national sport was significantly reformed 
under the changing international environment. Although the political functions of 
Chinese national sport would not change during the reforms, the old slogan, "friendship 
first, competition second," was no longer used. Instead, new ones, such as "break out of 
Asia, advance into the world," and "achieve glory for the motherland," expressed the 
emerging Chinese ambition of winning in international sports competitions.118 Rather 
than using sport as a weapon to attack its political enemies, the PRC government gave 
Chinese national sport new meanings: winning in international sports competitions in 
order to reflect a positive national image and enhance international status.119 As a result, 
the "Olympic Strategy," as the major goal of Chinese national sport, was determined at 
the beginning of the 1980s. It emphasized that the highest priority of Chinese national 
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sport was to win the Olympic gold medal. There were two branches of Chinese sports: 
national competitive sports and mass sports. The former required enhancing elite athletic 
performance while the latter required popularizing modern sports to citizens.120 
According to this Olympic Strategy, enhancing elite athletic performance was the 
emphasis of the two. This required the whole country, including national sport 
organizations, provincial sport organizations, and grass roots sport units to work 
collectively, to achieve Olympic gold medals. This goal was at the foundation of the 
national strategy of China sport.121 Based on this principle, the Whole Nation System (Ju 
Guo Ti Zhi) was reformed and intensified to administer and regulate Chinese national 
sport.122 
The Whole Nation System was a nationwide sport system with the same goals 
(Olympic gold medals), consistent administration, state controlled sport resources (human 
resources and facility resources), and state and provincial financial support.523 As an 
independent, closed, and vertical system, the Whole Nation System was led by the GASC 
who supervised the provincial sports organizations. In each province, the provincial sport 
administration supervised all grass roots sports units and sport training schools within the 
province. In all sport training schools, elementary schools, and middle schools, potential 
young athletes were systematically selected and trained. Through multi-level tryouts, a 
few were selected for provincial professional sport teams and continued training for 
higher levels. Finally, a few young athletes from all the provincial training teams were 
selected to become national team players who would represent the country by competing 
in the Olympic Games and other international sports competitions.124 Basically, there 
were four sub-systems in the Whole Nation System: (1) sport administration system; (2) 
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training system; (3) competition system; and (4) financial system. Moreover, there 
were still some auxiliary systems including the athletes' education system, anti-doping 
system, training base system, and the information and technology system, which assisted 
and ensured the whole system was running well. 
Following the reinstatement by the IOC, the GASC reformed the Whole Nation 
System in order to further fit the Olympic Games and pursue the goal of Chinese national 
sport under the Olympic Strategy. First, the competition system was intensified. National 
competitions were increased both in quantity and quality. The GASC pointed out that 
competition was an efficient way to enhance training conditions and accumulate 
empirical experiences for international competitions. Second, in the training system, the 
sport events were re-arranged to resemble those in the Olympic Games. According to the 
GASC, during the preparation of the 5th Chinese National Games held in September 1983, 
the organizers received a request from the GASC that the sport events should be 
consistent with the Olympic sport events.127 This readjustment saw many new sport 
events developed at the beginning of the 1980s and more financial support added to the 
system throughout China.128 In addition, the GASC realized that the education level of 
Chinese elite athletes should be improved as soon as possible because most of them 
terminated their normal education during adolescence.129 The GASC emphasized in its 
report that the low education level of elite athletes had become obstacles for them to 
improve their athletic performance. Thus, providing them with higher education was an 
urgent task.130 To enhance athletic performance, sport science and new technology were 
also stressed by the GASC. During the 1980s, more than 20 new sport research institutes 
were established in China.131 Academic journals such as Science of Physical Education 
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and Athletics and China Sport Medicine were established. As a closed system, the 
enhanced investment increased the burden on Chinese national sport. However, for its 
new political meanings, Chinese national sport received aid from the government without 
hesitation. With the full support of the government, the improvement in Chinese national 
sport was significant during this period (Appendix VIII). 
The GASC allocated more attention to the sport events that the Chinese athletes 
were not good at and in which there were many gold medals produced in the Olympic 
Games such as Track and Field. As a result, the Chinese athletes won eleven gold medals 
and broke four Asian records at the 4th Asian Athletic Championship in Tokyo in June 
1981.133 Following the participation in the World University Games one month later, 
despite the Chinese athletes winning the men's triple jump gold medal and the silver 
medal in men's long jump and high jump, Rong Gaotang, a Chinese sport leader, 
expressed his concern when he was interviewed by the People's Radio Station in August. 
He stated that there was still a big difference between Chinese athletes and the world's 
elite athletes and a long-term goal should be set for track and field, swimming and 
gymnastics.134 He also suggested that as the basis of national sports, the training facilities 
throughout China should be updated as soon as possible.135 His opinion on athletics in 
China was supported later by PRC Vice-Premier Yang Jingren who encouraged sport 
practitioners to improve Chinese athletic performance at all cost. In addition to the 
track and field events, during this three-year period, the Chinese women's volleyball 
team won the gold medal at the 3rd World Cup in 1981 and the Championship at the 
World Women's Volleyball Championship in 1982.137 The Chinese table tennis team 
won all seven gold medals at the 36th World Table Tennis Championships in 1981 and six 
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out of seven gold medals at the 37th World Table Tennis Championships in 1983.138 
Moreover, both Chinese men and women's gymnastic teams finished the competitions 
with the top three position at the 21st World Championships in 1981. One year later, in 
December 1982, Li Ning won the all-around gold medal and five out of six gold medals 
of individual events at the 6th World Gymnastics Cup. Li Ning became the first gymnast 
in the world to win six gold medals in one major international competition.139 Led by Li 
Ning, in October 1983, the Chinese gymnastic team won the men's team champion at the 
22nd World Gymnastic Championship.140 The Chinese badminton team won four gold 
medals in the badminton tournament of the 1st World Games in 1981 and won the men's 
team Champion at the 12th World Badminton Championships in 1982.141 In particular, 
Chinese athletes made their breakthrough at the 9th Asian Games staging in New Delhi in 
November 1982. The GASC sent a 445-athlete delegation to compete in all the events 
except boxing, golf, equestrian sports, and women's field hockey. Surpassing the 
Japanese delegation, the Chinese delegation for the first time finished the Games in the 
top position by winning sixty-one gold, fifty-one silver, and forty-one bronze medals.142 
The frequency of the Chinese athletes' participation in international competitions 
was significantly increased during this period. These frequent competitions also saw the 
Chinese athletes compete with athletes from the countries seldom seen in the previous 
decade. In October 1982, a Chinese sport delegation led by He Zhenliang, a Chinese IOC 
member, visited the German Democratic Republic renewing bilateral sport 
communications following a nineteen-year termination.143 A Chinese gymnastic team 
went to Moscow to compete at the Moscow International Gymnastic Invitational 
Tournament in March 1982 and won one gold, three silver, and two bronze medals.144 In 
105 
August 1983, the GASC invited the national champion football (soccer) team of the 
Soviet Union to China. This was the first Soviet sport team to visit China in the 1980s.145 
The sport communications with the eastern European countries indicated a change in 
Chinese national sport strategy during the period. In sum, between 1981 and 1983, 
Chinese athletes participated in more than 158 international competitions (the ones in 
which more than three countries participated) and achieved more than 710 gold 
medals.146 Among these competitions, Chinese athletes won 77 world champions and 
broke 36 world records (Appendix IX).147 These efforts were made for one goal, the 
production of Olympic medals - the ultimate goal of Chinese national sport. Specifically, 
the target was to achieve more Olympic medals during the Los Angeles Olympic Games 
in the following year, 1984. 
Section HI: China's Preparation for the Los Angeles Olympic Games, 1984 
In 1984, to serve its domestic economic development, which was considered the 
most important task of the country, the PRC government continued carrying out its 
balanced and mutually beneficial foreign policy initiated at the beginning of the 1980s, 
especially as it related to the two superpowers. It was believed that the domestic economy 
could be enhanced with a secure international political environment. Thus, it was argued, 
the PRC would attain more international economic assistance. The PRC emphasized 
that "relations with both the USA and the Soviet Union would be developed on a strictly 
bilateral basis and not with an eye towards threatening or frightening the third part of the 
triangle."149 As the PRC was in the middle of the two superpowers, they did not have a 
very close relationship with either of them. On one hand, the Taiwan issue was an 
obstacle blocking enhanced relations between the PRC and the USA. The divarication on 
the issue resulted in the inconsistency that made it impossible for the two countries to 
create an environment that fostered mutual trust. On the other hand, the border threats 
from the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese ally were still the main national security 
concerns with which the PRC had to be very careful. Although the Sino-Soviet talks had 
resumed in 1982, the PRC government was still cautious with what it considered a 
dangerous neighbour.150 In particular, in April 1984, continuous military conflicts broke 
out along the Sino-Vietnamese border.151 The PRC government condemned the 
Vietnamese invading its neighbour (Kampuchea) and sent a strong signal to the Soviet 
Union not to utilize Vietnam as a military base to threaten the PRC.152 As an ally of 
Vietnam, on 9 May 1984 Soviet leaders postponed their visit to Beijing, which was four 
days before the PRC government formally announced that they would attend the 1984 
Los Angeles Olympic Games and nine days after president Reagan formally visited the 
PRC.153 In a summary in 1984, Goldstein stated, 
...throughout 1984 China was performing a delicate balancing act: 
developing enough of a strategic relationship with the US to give Soviet 
military planners second thoughts and keeping the Sino-US economic 
relationship growing even while convincing Moscow that it was 
interested in better relations and was not taking sides in the global 
Soviet-American confrontation.154 
Despite these international situations, to revive its economy, the PRC had been 
developing international relations under its independent foreign policy during the five-
year period. Specifically, this principle was also applied in the sport domain to improve 
the relationships with the IOC and International Sport Federations (ISFs) during the same 
period. As early as 1980, several months after its recognition by the IOC, the COC gave 
up its right and announced that it would boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. In a 
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letter to the COC in March 1980, IOC President Lord Killanin expressed his 
disappointment by stating that from his personal point of view he would have 
considerable reservations in proceeding with the candidature of a new member of the IOC 
if the COC did not participate in the Moscow Olympic Games.155 His successor, Juan 
Antonio Samaranch, did not express the same reservations although he made great efforts 
to help with the recognition of the COC. According to Wei Jizhong, a representative of 
the Chinese delegation to the 83rd IOC Session in Moscow in July 1980, prior to the 
election of the new IOC president, Samaranch asked the Chinese representative to help 
him in the election as he did a lot to help the COC in its reinstatement.156 On 16 July 
1980 Samaranch became the new president of the IOC.157 
Following becoming the president, Samaranch immediately worked on the "Two 
Chinas" issue. Because the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee did not agree with the 
IOC's solution made in 1979, and as Samaranch promised, he continued to seek a final 
resolution for both Taiwan and the PRC. Samaranch promised the Taiwanese IOC 
member that the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee would be treated the same as any 
other national Olympic committees if they accepted the IOC's resolution regarding the 
name, national flags, and anthems for both the PRC and Taiwan Olympic Committees.158 
Based on this promise, a formal agreement between the IOC and the Chinese Taipei 
Olympic Committee was signed in March 1981.159 The effort saw the "Two Chinas" 
issue ultimately settled to the satisfaction of all three parties. Meanwhile, Samaranch 
created and maintained a good relationship between the IOC and the PRC during the 
early part of the 1980s. Invited by the COC, Samaranch visited Beijing in March 1982 to 
meet Deng Xiaoping, leader of the PRC. During the meeting, Samaranch said, "I have 
always been a friend of your great country and shall remain so in the future." The COC 
praised Samaranch for his great contribution to the international Olympic Movement and 
awarded him a Chinese Sport Honorary Medal.161 Lord Killanin was also invited to visit 
by the PRC in May of the same year. Deng Xiaoping accorded him a warm greeting of 
the kind reserved for old friends. The visit gave Lord Killanin the opportunity to 
witness the great strides made by the PRC in their provision of sports installations and 
training facilities.163 In September 1983, Samaranch visited China again to attend the 5th 
Chinese National Games in Shanghai.164 During this visit, Samaranch presented a silver 
medal of the Olympic Order to Rong Gaotang (1912-2006), an extraordinary Chinese 
sport leader, in recognition of his contributions to Chinese sport. This marked the first 
time a Chinese sport leader was awarded such an honour from the IOC.165 In January 
1984, Li Menghua, the supervisor of the GASC was invited by Samaranch to visit the 
headquarters of the IOC in Lausanne.16 Li Menghua formally met Samaranch in 
Lausanne and exchanged opinions on the development of the Olympic Movement in 
China. Following the visit, the IOC issued an official announcement on Li Menghua's 
visit and agreed to sponsor the Beijing International Marathon events in 1984 and 
1985.168 In September 1984, Samaranch visited China for the third time and bestowed 
another silver medal to Zhong Shitong (1913-2001), the former President of the COC.169 
During this visit, Samaranch and his wife were invited to stand along with the senior 
Chinese leaders on the balcony of Tiananmen to watch the Chinese National Day Parade. 
This was intended to express the importance of the relationship that had developed 
between the IOC and the PRC.170 
109 
In addition, following Samaranch's recommendation and arrangement, He 
Zhenliang, a Chinese sport leader, was elected as the first Chinese IOC member in 
October 1981.171 Given that the COC submitted its candidate list on 23 February 1980, 
the election was supposed to be held at the IOC General Session in Moscow in July 
1980.172 However, as the PRC announced its boycott decision in April, Samaranch 
thought it was impossible for He Zhengliang to be elected in Moscow in July. Thus, 
based on Samaranch's suggestion, the IOC Executive Board determined that the election 
would be postponed until the General Session in Baden-Baden in 1981 thereby ensuring 
He Zhenliang would be elected successfully.173 Expectedly, He Zhenliang and six other 
candidates were elected at the Baden-Baden in 1981. 
Prior to being elected as an IOC member, He Zhenliang had represented the PRC 
and confronted the IOC on the issue of "Two Chinas" with tenacity. In contrast, as an 
IOC member, He Zhenliang changed from a rival to a partner cooperating with the IOC 
to develop the Olympic Movement in China. In 1983, He Zhenliang suggested that the 
IOC should pay more attention to mass sports because elite sport that the IOC always 
emphasized would lose its basis without the support from mass sports.174 Samaranch 
accepted his advice and organized the Sport for All Commission and He Zhenliang was 
assigned the task of Vice-Chairmen of the Commission. In 1984, He Zhenliang noticed 
that Asian and African representation in the IOC was much less than that of the 
representation from Western countries. He stated that balancing the IOC membership 
from all the member nations would benefit the IOC thereby improving its globalization 
and enhancing the development of the Olympic Movement in those developing 
countries. Samaranch also accepted his suggestion and absorbed a Japanese athlete as a 
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member of the IOC Athletes' Commission in 1984. Given his good relationship with 
Samaranch and many other IOC members, combined with his excellent working record, 
He Zhenliang was nominated as a member of Executive Board and elected in 1985.176 
Following Samaranch's suggestion, the IOC added an additional seat for Vice-President 
(from three to four) in 1988. Later in 1989, He Zhenliang was nominated to be a Vice-
President by a group of IOC members led by Kevan Gosper, an Australian IOC member, 
and successfully elected to be the fourth IOC Vice-President.177 His rapid ascension from 
IOC member to member of the Executive Board, and then the Vice-President was 
unprecedented in the history of the IOC. He Zhenliang's success was called "He's triple 
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jump" in the media. Yet, it must be acknowledged that "He's triple jump" would not 
have happened without the help of Samaranch and other IOC members who worked to 
build a good relationship with the PRC. 
When it came to the 1980s, China increasingly participated in international sport 
activities and many IOC members and countries showed their cooperative attitudes 
towards China. For example, in 1984, Chinese athletes participated in 38 international 
sports competitions and 625 bilateral sports communications with more than 70 countries 
around the world.179 In particular, in March 1984, the COC formally submitted the 
application to the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) to host the 11th Asian Games, which 
was fully supported by Samaranch.580 The support received was not only because of He 
Zhenliang's relationship with those in the IOC, but also because the PRC expressed a 
more positive and flexible attitude toward the international community. Because of this 
significant shift, Chinese national sport further showcased its performance in 1984. 
I l l 
Luan Jujie, a talented female fencer, won the championship in the Foil Fencing 
event at the World Fencing Championship in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
February 1984. This was the first world championship for a Chinese athlete in 1984.181 In 
April, Chinese athletes participated in a series of Asian sports competitions. The Chinese 
Judo team won three silver and three bronze medals at the 5th Asian Judo Championships 
in Kuwait; the Chinese swimming team won nineteen gold, nine silver, and two bronze 
medals at the 2nd Asian Swimming Championships in Seoul.182 In May, Yan Hong and 
Xu Yongjiu broke the world record of the women's 5 KM Road Walking events in 
Norway.183 And also in May, the Chinese Badminton squad won the Champion of 
women's team and the silver medal of men's team at the Badminton World Cup in 
Malaysia.184 In June, Zhu Jianhua, a Chinese high jumper, set a new world record of 
2.39m at an international athletic competition in Germany. This was the third time he 
broke the world record during the previous twelve month period.185 In addition to those 
adult sports competitions, Chinese youth athletes also participated in international sport 
events, which indicated that the GASC had allocated more attention to young athletes' 
training for future Olympic Games. The Chinese youth basketball squad won the 
women's championship and the men's silver medal at the 8th Asian Youth Basketball 
Championship in April. One month later, the Chinese youth weightlifting team won five 
silver and one bronze medal at the 10th World Youth Weightlifting Championships in 
Italy. In July, the Chinese youth wrestling team won two gold medals at the World Youth 
Wrestling Championships in the USA.186 However, in the winter sport events, Chinese 
athletes were unable to achieve a breakthrough during the year. In February, the COC 
sent a thirty-seven-athlete delegation to participate in the 14th Winter Olympic Games in 
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Sarajevo. The results saw that there was no one close to top forty in each of the events 
that Chinese athletes competed.188 The poor performance in the Winter Olympic Games 
did not negatively influence Chinese enthusiasm for their national sports at the time. The 
attention and effort of the PRC, the GASC, the COC, and the Chinese athletes were 
focused on the coming Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. 
As early as November 1980, the COC had already expressed that the Chinese 
athletes would participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. During an interview 
by China Sport News, Zhong Shitong, the president of the COC, stated that the greatest 
efforts would be made for the 1984 and 1988 Olympic Games, which was the emphasis 
of the tasks of the COC and all Chinese athletes. During Samaranch's visit to Beijing 
in March 1982, Deng Xiaoping told Samaranch that the Chinese athletes would 
participate in the Los Angeles Olympic Games as long as the USA would not treat 
Taiwan as an independent nation.190 Even during the Hu Na incident in April 1983, the 
PRC government and the COC did not change their decision as it related to their 
participation. As the response to the Hu Na incident, the PRC government immediately 
called a halt to all Sino-US sports and cultural communications including their 
participation in the LAOOC's pre-Olympic events. According to Ueberroth, the LAOOC 
sent a telex to Zhong Shitong explaining that the LAOOC did not agree with the US 
government decision and hoped the COC would reconsider and send their athletes to the 
USA.191 Zhong Shitong replied that the COC would not, but he assured Ueberroth that 
the Hu Na incident would not affect the COC's participation in 1984.192 On 25 September 
1983 the GASC held a conference in Shanghai discussing the detailed preparation for the 
1984 Olympic Games.193 Later in December, the GASC publicly announced that Chinese 
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athletes would participate in the Los Angeles Olympic Games. They also stated that the 
COC would send a delegation with more than 300 athletes competing in more than 15 
events.194 This would mark the biggest delegation ever in Chinese sport history.195 One 
day later, the COC held the conference in Beijing emphasizing intensified training during 
the winter months for the coming Olympic Games.1 As preparations continued, a group 
of COC officials, led by COC Vice-President Chen Xian, visited Los Angeles in January 
1984.197 In a public statement in the USA, Chen Xian promised that the COC would send 
a 300-athlete delegation to the Games to strengthen understanding and friendship of 
different countries, thus protecting world peace as well as lending impetus to the 
improvement of international sport.198 
Although the word "boycott" was never used in Soviet statements regarding the 
1984 Olympic Games, the idea of non-participation was initiated prior to 1984. 
According to Ueberroth, Soviet concern regarding participation in the Los Angeles 
Olympic Games existed in 1982 when he first met Sergei Pavlov, the president of the 
Soviet Union Olympic Committee, in Moscow.199 Pavlov stated that he could not imagine 
how Soviet athlete could attend the Los Angeles Games when at the hockey finals in 
Lake Placid the Americans kept chanting kill the Russians. When Marat Gramov 
replaced Pavlov in February 1983, Gramov complained that Soviet requests regarding 
landing Aeroflot charter planes and docking a Soviet cruise ship in the Los Angeles' 
harbor were being postponed by the US government.201 On 8 May 1984 the Soviet Union 
announced that their athletes would not participate in the Los Angeles Olympic Games 
because of fears of athletes' safety. They also claimed that there would be 100 countries 
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following their decision.202 According to Ueberroth, the PRC was on the top of the Soviet 
list.203 
On May 10, the LAOOC immediately decided to send a small delegation to 
Beijing to discuss the PRC's participation with Chinese sport leaders.204 The delegation 
was welcomed enthusiastically by the Chinese sports ministers and the GASC. During 
the three day meeting, both sides signed an agreement stating that the PRC would still 
send its sport delegation to Los Angeles as originally planned.206 According to Ueberroth, 
the PRC announcement on May 12 gave LAOOC their first public victory over the 
Soviets.207 This was not only a victory for LAOOC, Ueberroth stated, the participation of 
the PRC in 1984 was also a turning point of his life.208 The COC was true to its word. On 
17 May, the COC formally announced in Beijing that the Chinese sport delegation for the 
Los Angeles Olympic Games had been created.209 On 16 July 1984 the 325-athlete 
Chinese sport delegation arrived at Los Angeles where fifty-two years ago only one 
Chinese athlete had competed in the 10th Olympic Games.210 During the following two 
weeks, Chinese athletes shocked the world by achieving 15 gold, 8 silver, and 9 bronze 
medals and finishing the Games in the fourth position on the unofficial medal tally. 
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national sport a weapon with which they struggled with Taiwanese authorities in the 
international sport arena. In 1952, although the Chinese sport delegation only competed 
in one swimming event, the government was satisfied with the result because they had 
hoisted their national flag at the Helsinki Olympic Games. In 1956, the PRC refused to 
participate in the Melbourne Olympic Games because the IOC allowed the Taiwanese 
athletes to compete, a violation of the PRC's "one China" policy. The PRC withdrew 
from the IOC in 1958 for similar reasons. In the 1960s, due to the conflict between the 
IOC and the PRC, the latter once again utilized its national sport as a weapon in its 
struggle with the IOC. The PRC sponsored and organized the GANEFO in 1963 and the 
Asian GANEFO in 1966. During the 1970s, the PRC made efforts to improve the 
bilateral relationship with the USA as well as other Western countries. Chinese national 
sport was again used, but this time as a diplomatic tool, assisting the government in its 
efforts to emerge from its isolation. 
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As Cui Lequan stated, "for different historical stages, the PRC applied relevant 
strategies and tactics to Chinese national sport so that it could produce maximum energy 
serving the PRC's state interests. For example, in regard to the Moscow and the Los 
Angeles Olympic Games, the strategies were definitely different." The difference 
originated from the shifting international environment between 1980 and 1984. During 
this period, the rivalry between the two superpowers intensified and became one of the 
most dangerous crises threatening the whole world. International sport was not immune 
to the crisis, especially as it related to the Olympic Games. As Keba M'Baye, an IOC 
member in Senegal, stated in 1980, "The danger which threatens Olympism has two 
sources: money and politics - two devils which have invaded, dominated, and debased 
everything these days, and sport is no exception." The ability of the international 
Olympic Movement to respond was seriously challenged when compared with the 
influence of the two superpowers throughout the world. Faced with the political turmoil 
of the boycott of the Moscow and Los Angeles Olympic Games from the two 
superpowers in 1980 and 1984, the IOC could do little but unsuccessful diplomacy and 
ineffective reiteration of the apolitical characteristic of the Olympic Games. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, the Olympic Games were anything but apolitical; politics 
consumed the Games and adversely affected it. Both the Soviet Union and the USA 
utilized the Olympic Games to express their national power and superiority.4 However, 
propaganda can often be a double-edged sword.5 The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
were boycotted as a diplomatic response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while the 
Soviet Union was trying to use it as a propaganda to showcase their advanced communist 
society. Four years later, the Soviet Union responded by boycotting the Los Angeles 
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Olympic Games under the guise of security. The Olympic Games became an efficient 
political weapon in the rivalry between the two superpowers at the beginning of the 
1980s, and the IOC found itself unprepared to respond to the situation at the time. 
Surrounded by the complicated international environment, one dominated by the 
intense rivalry between the two superpowers, the PRC sought its own foreign strategies to 
protect the sovereignty of China and develop its national powers. The Sino-Soviet 
alliance built in the early 1950s deteriorated in the 1960s due to emerging controversies 
on the ideological level. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Soviet Union terminated its 
aid projects in China and recalled its advisors and experts working in China. The PRC did 
not back down under the increased political pressure and criticized the Soviet revisionism. 
On the other side, Sino-US relations were virtually non-existent in the 1950s due to the 
Korean War (1950-1953) and the US government's Taiwan policy. Although the 
ceasefire agreement on the Korean War was signed in 1953, the two countries remained 
adversaries and the military confrontations on the Korean Peninsula continued. 
Meanwhile, the PRC government strongly protested the US military intervention at 
Taiwan Strait that resulted in the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 and another in 1958. 
These incidents adversely affected Sino-US relations throughout the 1950s. Seeking to 
restore a limited relationship, the PRC and the USA initiated a bilateral dialogue in the 
1960s. The talks between the two countries were intermittent and depended on the 
changing situations in the Taiwan Strait as well as the international political situations 
throughout the world. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, Sino-Soviet border conflicts significantly increased, 
with both sides having casualties during the military clashes. As a result, the relationship 
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between the two countries further deteriorated, evidenced by intensified military outposts 
situated along the border. The Soviet Union stationed up to one millions troops and 
deployed one-third of its total missiles inventory along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-
Mongolian borders.6 In response, the PRC further adjusted its diplomatic strategies 
expressing the rapprochement to the US government. Thus, they moved to associate 
themselves with one superpower in an effort to resist the other. To accomplish this goal, 
Chinese national sport once again was used as a political tool, although this time to build 
a bridge to unite two countries. "Ping-Pong diplomacy" was the bridge that united these 
two countries in 1971. Utilizing table-tennis as a precursor to diplomatic talks, the two 
countries soon initiated diplomatic visits. Senior government officials from both sides 
visited each other exchanging opinions on various issues regarding international politics, 
Sino-US relations, and more importantly, the attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Although 
the political and ideological differences still existed, the two governments now 
considered the Soviet Union as their common enemy. Based on this commonalty, the 
PRC continued improving Sino-US relations during the second half of the 1970s, which 
remained unchanged even following Mao Zedong's death in 1976 and the transformation 
of the PRC's leadership in 1978. As a result, Sino-US relations made great strides in 
1979; the two countries established diplomatic relations and initiated a number of 
bilateral cooperation agreements. Furthermore, while visiting Beijing in 1980 US Vice-
President Walter Mondale expressed that mutual security interests should be shared by 
the USA and the PRC. His statement suggested that the US government had tilted its 
evenhanded policy toward the Soviet Union and the PRC to the PRC side at the time.7 
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As Sino-US relations improved, Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated during 
the same period. In addition to increasing military threats at the PRC's northern border, 
the Soviet Union also allied themselves with Vietnam thereby creating a threat at the 
PRC's southern border by the end of the 1970s. Moreover, Soviet military forces invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979. This action was seen as a serious threat to the national 
security of the PRC by the government. Based on Wu Shouzhang, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan would besiege China from the west; meanwhile, the Soviet Union would 
achieve its purpose of expansion in Asia thereby isolating China.8 This perspective was 
generally accepted by the PRC government, the PRC media, and Chinese scholars.9 
Facing possible isolation, the PRC government took steps to fight back against its 
dangerous neighbour to protect national security. 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to some degree, the PRC 
government was more anxious than the US government to seek out an efficient way to 
punish the Soviet Union, at least, to delay Soviet military expansion in Asia. For the USA, 
the Soviet invasion threatened its energy base in the Middle East, while for the PRC, the 
threat was directly on its national security. On 3 January 1980, Huang Hua, the minister 
of the PRC Foreign Affair Ministry, stated that the Soviet Union was challenging the 
whole world and all the countries who loved peace should unify to resist Soviet 
expansionism.10 The announcement expressed the PRC's deep concern over the Soviet 
invasion and the expectation that more countries join the anti-Soviet group. The PRC 
understood that it needed supporters standing at its side if it was to be successful. Thus, 
when Jimmy Carter suggested the possible punishment to the Soviet Union, the boycott 
of the Moscow Olympic Games, the PRC government followed without hesitation. 
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Although the COC had been reinstated by the IOC only three months earlier, the PRC 
still determined to follow the USA and boycott the Moscow Olympic Games in January 
1980. Once again, Chinese national sport was to serve the national interests of the PRC. 
Therefore, national sport in China was sacrificed when necessary to secure the 
government's interests. From a perspective of state politics, this sacrifice brought a 
positive effect during the following months in 1980. Although the motives for the two 
countries were not the same, both the PRC and the USA would like to have the Soviet 
Union punished. The US government appreciated the PRC's decision. In response, 
Jimmy Carter made two decisions at the end of January on the transfer of technical 
equipment to the PRC. One allowed the PRC further access to American dual-use (both 
military and civilian use) technology. The other permitted American firms to export non-
lethal military equipment to the PRC.11 Sequentially, the Secretary of Defense, Harold 
Brown, visited China in February, marking the first high-level military contact between 
the two countries in last thirty years. Three months later, both sides took another step on 
their way toward military cooperation when PRC Vice-Premier Geng Biao visited 
Washington, D.C. During the visit, the Pentagon announced a further easing of USA 
export restrictions on military-related equipment to the PRC.12 This relationship was 
further enhanced following the meeting between Jimmy Carter and PRC Premier Hua 
Guofeng in Tokyo in July. The US government cleared more than 400 export licenses to 
the PRC covering equipment ranging from helicopters and flight simulation equipment to 
aerial cameras and long-range radar installations.13 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
accelerated the cooperation between the USA and the PRC. However, if the PRC did not 
follow Jimmy Carter's suggestion regarding the boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games, 
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it is clear that the development of Sino-US bilateral military cooperation would have been 
harmed. 
Following the US Presidential elections, Reagan's administration took office in 
January 1981. Although Reagan reassessed the Taiwan issue during his election 
campaign and claimed that the relationship with Taiwan should be improved, Sino-US 
relations were not seriously affected but largely maintained at a normal level during the 
next few years. Facing the PRC's concern regarding Reagan's opinion toward Taiwan, 
US Secretary of State Haig, in March 1981, stressed the significance of the strategic basis 
of the relationship between the USA and the PRC.14 Despite the emphasis, the USA still 
implemented its project of arms sales to Taiwan in late 1981. The two governments 
initiated a series of discussions aimed at finding a possible solution to the issue. The 
result saw the Third Sino-US Joint Communique signed in the middle of 1982. With 
compromises from the both sides, the two governments temporarily reached a deal on the 
Taiwan issue in order to continue existing bilateral cooperation. Both sides did not want 
to lose the strategic basis of the relationship, namely, anti-Soviet military expansion. 
Although the US government agreed to gradually decrease arms sales to Taiwan in the 
following years, this issue made the PRC leaders realized that there were still significant 
obstacles between the two countries. As a significant warning, the crisis surrounding the 
sale of arms to Taiwan between 1981 and 1982 alarmed the PRC, and ensured that it 
would be cautious when developing its relationships with the two superpowers in the 
future. Any extreme relationship between the PRC and either of the superpowers was 
deemed inappropriate and even dangerous by the government. Compared to the two 
superpowers, the PRC was relatively weak, especially in areas such as the economy, 
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industry, technology, and national defense. Due to the gap in national power and the 
changing international environment at the time, the PRC realized that they should 
exercise extreme caution when improving the relationship with the USA too quickly 
while ignoring the relationship with the Soviet Union, and vice versa. 
When Sino-US relations cooled because of the US government's decision to sell 
arms to Taiwan between 1981 and 1983, there was a significant shift in the PRC's 
attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Although the PRC government and its media 
continued to criticize the Soviet expansion and emphasized that the Soviet threats on the 
PRC's national security still existed, they also emphasized that the Soviet Union was 
experiencing domestic difficulties that constrained its foreign policies. The PRC stressed 
that Soviet domestic difficulties were caused by its continuous military buildup and 
expansion in Asia and Europe; when the Soviet Union tore down other innocent countries 
they also tore down themselves. In the PRC's media, the reports regarding the Soviet 
economic problems and the hard life of Soviet people increased significantly, which were 
usually accompanied by the comment that stopping expansion was the only way to solve 
their domestic problems. In addition, in 1982, there were some signs of improvement on 
the bilateral relationships between the two countries. The PRC attempted to modify its 
long-standing posture of rigid hostility toward the Soviet Union.15 Once again, Chinese 
athletes became the diplomatic precursor to open a door between the two countries. A 
Chinese gymnastic team participated in an international event in Moscow in March 1982. 
The Chinese media emphatically reported that the Chinese athletes had friendly 
conversations with their Soviet counterparts.16 Meanwhile, the Soviet government sent its 
leading Chinese specialists to the PRC for a private visit. Several months later, another 
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Soviet delegation, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Association, made an unofficial visit to 
Beijing.17 More significantly, in connection to the celebrations around New Year of 1982, 
Zhao Jin, the director of the Radio Beijing, broadcast New Year Greetings to the Soviet 
people. In the greetings, he said, "Dear friend, allow me... to warmly congratulate you on 
the New Year and wish you lots of happiness, good health and success in your work... we 
hope that in next year our relations and friendship will be consolidated even more."18 All 
these events indicated that both countries tried to improve the bilateral relations and 
reduce the hostility. As a result, the Sino-Soviet border negotiations resumed in 1982, 
which had been suspended following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
Through the changes that the PRC made regarding the relationships with the two 
superpowers, it is believed that the PRC's foreign policies became more realistic and 
practical between 1981 and 1983. The reason for this change was that for domestic 
restoration and reconstruction, the PRC shifted its working emphasis from the previous 
class struggle to economic development. A peaceful international political environment 
would be helpful and beneficial for the economic restoration within the PRC. 
The PRC determined in 1982 that economic construction would become the 
center of all tasks throughout the country. It was believed by the PRC leaders that 
enhancing the economy was the only way to increase national power thereby positioning 
China as a strong country in the world. A series of economic reforms and readjustments 
were initiated beginning in 1982. The major theme in economic reforms was coined in a 
slogan proposed by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang: "Opening to the outside world and 
invigorating the domestic economy."19 Based on this principle, and in addition the 
constructive relationships with the two superpowers, the PRC also tried to build good 
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relationships with other countries all over the world. By 1984, there were more than one 
hundred and twenty countries in the world with established diplomatic relations with the 
PRC. With the communications with these countries, especially in the economic domain, 
the PRC further realized that international politics must be maintained in a cooperative 
environment in order to accomplish the central task of the country, the development of its 
domestic economy. Therefore, rather than resisting and attacking, achieving mutual 
national interests became the strategic basis of the PRC's foreign policies. The years 
between 1982 and 1984 saw significant efforts by the PRC to pursue its diplomatic and 
national economic goals. 
During this period, to serve the new strategic basis of the PRC's foreign policies 
and the central task of the country, the vision, the mission, and the operational principles 
of Chinese national sport was endued with new functions. Pursuing gold medals in the 
Olympic Games became the top goal and the only mission for Chinese national sport.20 
The vision for Chinese national sport was that the PRC would become a strong country in 
the sport domain at the end of twentieth century.21 Based on this vision, Chinese national 
sport was no longer a political means to improve existing relationships or foster new 
friendships between the PRC and the other countries; it became a strong weapon to 
showcase the PRC's national powers and its positive international image. 
Dominating over Chinese national sport between the 1950s and the 1970s, the 
slogan "friendship first, competition second" was quite popular among the Chinese 
people. At the time, the PRC manipulated sport competitions with other countries as a 
practical means to please opponents so that it could obtain its diplomatic purposes. The 
result saw the Chinese athletes in some international sport competitions intentionally lose 
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games to satisfy the opponents' government. Such actions violated sportsmanship, 
impeded the development of Chinese national sport and frustrated individual athletes' 
enthusiasm. Re-entering the Unites Nations and the IOC in the 1970s and reforming its 
national policy at the beginning of the 1980s, the PRC shifted both foreign and domestic 
strategies and opened its door to the international community. Simultaneously, the PRC 
government's attitudes regarding sport gradually changed. Different voices from the 
"friendship first, competition second" strategy started to emerge. Semi-official criticism 
pointed out that political sport provided no advantage to the development of Chinese 
national sport. Instead, it was argued, it sabotaged sport dangerously. Increasing emphasis 
was put into the importance of winning gold medals. In 1980, right before the Lake 
Placid Winter Olympic Games, China Sport News, the most influential sport newspaper 
in China, published an editorial which contended that to win competitions and achieve 
glory for the country, Chinese athletes must win friends as well as gold medals. 
Furthermore, according to the editorial, to achieve respect, Chinese athletes must first win 
gold medals and achieve world standards so that they were able to compete on a global 
scale. In contrast, it was suggested, if they merely took part in competitions but were 
incapable to win gold medals, national glory and dignity would be adversely affected.22 
Guided by this new shift in Chinese national sport and restricted by the fiscal 
limitations of the sport budget, the GASC initiated the national sport policy called "Ju 
Guo Ti Zhi (the Whole Nation System)," which was explained as "whole country support 
for the elite sport system."23 The system originated in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, was 
stopped during the Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976), and developed again in the 
1980s. In the system, the management was centralized thereby securing financial and 
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human resource support that was delivered throughout the whole country. Based on this 
system, young athletes in athletic training schools throughout China would be well 
trained and, those with potential would be chosen for the national teams. The only 
purpose of the well-trained young athletes was to be selected to compete for the country. 
Although it had nothing to do with mass sport and it could not enhance the average 
physical condition of the Chinese people, the system could absorb all potential young 
athletes throughout the country into the elite sport system and effectively cultivate them 
in a relatively short period of time.24 The system was reformed and intensified between 
1980 and 1984. Since Chinese athletes did not attend the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, 
the effectiveness and the positive results of the system appeared for the first time at the 
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. The Chinese athletes achieved great performance at 
the Los Angeles Olympic Games (Appendix I) encouraging the GASC to ratify the 
system and further affirm the Olympic Strategy in 1985. The GASC emphasized that elite 
sports was the priority throughout the country and the main task of the Whole Nation 
System was to win Olympic medals. The "Ju Guo Ti Zhi" was perfectly aligned with the 
PRC's Olympic Strategy. 
Although to express its clear political attitude, the PRC boycotted the 1980 
Olympic Games, it was timely to utilize the enhanced national sport to accomplish its 
different political purpose in 1984. Despite the difference, the two decisions regarding the 
boycott and the participation had their significant meanings, respectively. The PRC's 
boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games enhanced the bilateral relationship with the USA. 
By doing this, the two countries achieved respective national interests. The USA took 
advantage of the boycott to further isolate the Soviet Union from not only Western 
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countries, but also the countries all over the world, which brought the USA an ascendant 
position in the superpowers' rivalry during the Cold War.25 The boycott was an 
opportunity by which the PRC improved its relationships with Western countries and 
allowed them the opportunity to express that they also opposed the Soviet Union's 
expansion.26 More importantly, the PRC was largely relieved from the emerging Soviet 
military threat. First, the PRC was no longer alone in its resistance of the Soviet Union; it 
united itself with the USA and other Western countries against the Soviet Union. Second, 
the PRC signed military cooperation agreements with the USA to enhance its military 
technology thereby intensifying its national security. In contrast, the PRC determined to 
participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games without any hesitations because it 
provided the PRC with an excellent opportunity to enhance its international status and 
national pride. Even following hearing the announcement that the Soviet Union would 
not attend the Games, the PRC remained consistent with its decision. As Ueberroth said, 
following the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc's absence, China's participation saved the 
Los Angeles Olympic Games. This time, the PRC utilized participating in the Olympic 
Games instead of boycotting to improve the relationship with the USA. It also made use 
of this opportunity to showcase its positive global visibility to the world, especially those 
in the Western countries, which helped the PRC achieve the credits to establish trusted 
relationships. The PRC believed that the trusted relationships with Western countries 
would produce more cooperation and investment from these countries to support its 
domestic development, which was the most important task of the PRC. 
The absence of the Soviet Union and other communist countries provided another 
opportunity for the PRC, one that would see Chinese athletes claim more gold medals at 
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the Olympic Games. This was important for both the Chinese sport administration and 
the Chinese people to restore their confidence for the future development of Chinese 
national sport.28 Based on Zhao Yu's statistical investigation, in some events in which the 
Chinese athletes achieved gold medals at the Los Angeles Olympic Games in 1984, the 
performance of athletes at the alternative Friendship Games staged by the Soviet Union 
were better than that of the 1984 Olympic Games. Therefore, he concluded, if the 
Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries had competed in Los Angeles, the amount of the 
gold medals the Chinese athletes could achieve would be far less than what they actually 
got at the time (Appendix X). However, in 1984, few people in China realized the 
difference and doubted the great breakthrough that the Chinese athletes had achieved. 
The whole country was excited and encouraged by the brilliant achievement of Chinese 
national sport. The national glory kindled by the breakthrough in the Olympic Games 
filled the country with a clear sense of national pride. As a milestone of Chinese national 
sport, the participation in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games and the breakthrough 
the Chinese athletes made deeply influenced the Chinese people and intensified the 
confidence on their way to build up their country, which was more significant than its 
other meanings and effects. 
Comparing the facts of the PRC's participation in the Olympic Games between 
1980 and 1984, there were different international environments, different domestic 
realities, different motives, and different decisions. However, the purposes of the PRC's 
two decisions were clearly political and served its national interests, despite the fact the 
two decisions were completely opposite. The PRC made the different decisions 
depending on what social realities they were facing at different periods. These decisions 
were consistent with the theoretical construct of social existence derived from Historical 
Materialism, which identified that social existence of human beings determined their 
social consciousness; in turn, social consciousness would determine behaviours, actions, 
and decisions of human beings. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further threatened the 
PRC's national security pushing the PRC to the position expressed by the USA in order 
to protect itself. The decision of the boycott in 1980 was caused by the political situation 
surrounding the PRC at the time. Four years later, the PRC needed a peaceful 
international environment and trusted relationship with Western countries to assist its 
domestic economic development. Thus, the decision of the participation in 1984 was 
caused by the PRC's desire for a positive image and recognition in the world. The 
different actualities between 1980 and 1984 led to the PRC's two decisions. Therefore, it 
is argued that the findings throughout this research supported the theoretical construct of 
social existence. 
The Response to the Research Questions 
The research question stated in Chapter One was the original motive for this 
research endeavour; and to provide a contextual understanding of the topic while 
supporting the conclusions, four sub-questions were developed. Throughout the entirety 
of this document, these questions were answered by the researcher. In the following 
section, the response to the questions is listed based on both the literature reviewed and 
the findings discussed above. 
With regard to the first two sub-questions, Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-US 
relations between the 1950s and 1970s, opposite paths of development for the two were 
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shown. As the first country in the world to establish a diplomatic relationship with the 
PRC, the Soviet Union provided the new regime with significant assistance during the 
first half of the 1950s. The alliance between the two countries was built at the same time. 
During the second half of the 1950s, different opinions on ideological level appeared 
between the two countries. Later, controversies on both domestic and international 
strategies developed. During the second half of the 1960s, these controversies and the 
emerging disagreement between the two governments evolved into criticism and 
confrontation. At the end of the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet border clashes broke out. Both 
countries intensified their military outposts on the border during the beginning of the 
1970s. The tense and hostile bilateral relations lasted throughout the 1970s. On the other 
side, given the military confrontations throughout the Korean War between 1950 and 
1953, both the USA and the PRC saw each other as enemies. Bilateral relations between 
the two countries did not develop until the second half of the 1950s. Although both sides 
engaged in dialogue and maintained basic channels of communication, the Taiwan Strait 
issue remained an obstacle between the two governments. Sino-US relations did not have 
a breakthrough until the beginning of the 1970s. Following the PRC returning to the UN 
in 1971, the bilateral relationships between the PRC and the USA improved significantly. 
Both governmental and non-official communications between the two countries increased 
during the 1970s. In 1979, the two countries established diplomatic relations and spent 
one year accomplishing the normalization of multi-dimensions. Therefore, between the 
1950s and 1970s, in summary, the Soviet Union and the PRC shifted their relationship 
from friends to enemies, while the USA and the PRC shifted their relationship from 
enemies to friends, though the term "friends" here is replete with political purposes and 
national interests. 
With regard to the third sub-question, there were several factors that affected the 
two decisions regarding the participation in the Olympic Games between 1980 and 1984. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the most significant factor that resulted in the 
PRC's decision to boycott the Games in 1980. The invasion seriously threatened the 
PRC's national security by besieging the PRC along its west border, while the Soviet 
military forces had already threatened its north and south border during the 1970s. The 
PRC had to merge its interests with those of other countries to resist Soviet expansion. 
Thus, the PRC grasped the opportunity of the boycott in 1980 to associate with the USA 
and most other Western countries against the Soviet Union. In addition, between 1980 
and 1984, the significant domestic reforms in various areas happened throughout China. 
Rather than political struggles, economic reconstruction was put in the center of the 
country's tasks. All other tasks were to serve this central task at the time, and 
international relations and national sport were no exception. The PRC shifted its foreign 
policies based on the mutually beneficial principle in order to create a peaceful and 
cooperative environment that was beneficial to its domestic economic development. 
Moreover, the PRC improved its national sport performance as quickly as possible to win 
in international events so that it could gain a positive image and national glory thereby 
encouraging the Chinese people to reconstruct their country with more confidence. 
With regard to the forth sub-question, according to the interviews, both the 
Chinese sport officials and Chinese sport scholars stated that neither the GASC nor the 
COC made the decisions regarding the participations in the two Olympic Games. 
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Although the interviewees did not provide detailed information about the decision-
maker s), all of them believed that the decision of the boycott of the Moscow Olympic 
Games was made by the PRC government and the Ministry of Foreign Affair in January 
1980; the decision to participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games was made by 
the same decision-maker(s) as early as March 1982.32 Due to the fact that the archives of 
Chinese national sport in the GASC and the Ministry of Foreign Affair of the PRC are 
not open to either the public or academic use, more detailed information about the 
decision making procedure was not available to the researcher. 
Therefore, with regard to the research question, based on the responses of the four 
sub-questions, five primary reasons have been identified to explain why the PRC choose 
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games instead of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games as 
the debut of the Chinese athletes on the global sport stage: (1) the deteriorated Sino-
Soviet bilateral relations in the 1970s; (2) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; (3) 
the increasing improvement of Sino-US bilateral relations at the beginning of the 1980s; 
(4) the peaceful and cooperative international environment the PRC needed for its 
economic reform and reconstruction beginning in the early 1980s; and (5) the 
achievements at the Olympic Games the PRC needed to attain a positive international 
image and national glory. 
The Discussion regarding the Hypotheses 
Based on an initial review of the literature and in response to the research 
questions provided prior to the investigation, the researcher stated three main hypotheses 
(Chapter One). Following the discussion of the findings and the response to the research 
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questions above, it is argued that HI is the first item of the primary reasons noted above 
to explain the research question and H2 is the third item noted above (p. 146). Therefore, 
HI and H2 are fully supported and confirmed by the findings. 
With regard to H3, throughout the whole investigation, there was insufficient 
evidence to confirm the hypothesis. Although Chinese athletes' overall performance was 
low following their reinstatement by the IOC in 1979, the evidence is not sufficient to 
prove that the PRC decided not to send athletes to the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games 
because they did not want to risk a poor performance in 1980. According to Wu 
Shouzhang, the Chinese sport administration and Chinese athletes started to prepare for 
the 1980 Olympic Games immediately after their reinstatement; thus, he argues, it was 
impossible that the boycott was because of the concern of the poor athletic 
performance.33 Wang Dinghua also stated that the boycott of the Moscow Olympic 
Games was not about sport but national politics.34 He denied the government's concern 
regarding the low level performance [in 1980].35 Pei Dongguang indicated that if the 
hypothesis was correct, it would not be consistent with the PRCs experience at the 
Olympic Games in the 1950s.36 At the 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, Chinese athletes 
arrived at Finland when the Games were almost over. PRC Premier Zhou Enlai expressed 
that the most important thing was to hoist the PRC's flag in Helsinki. Thus, showing the 
PRC's political status in the Olympic Games was more significant than showing its 
athletic performance at the time. In addition, Chinese athletes had never achieved any 
medals at the Olympic Games prior to 1980; and the Olympic Strategy had not been 
clarified as the top goal of Chinese national sport at the time. Therefore, in 1980, the PRC 
did not care about the excellence of athletic performance, which was a significant 
concern in 1984. Furthermore, the researcher did not find any written evidence 
expressing the PRC's concern about poor athletic performance at the 1980 Olympic 
Games that potentially influenced the decision of the boycott in 1980. Therefore, H3 is 
not confirmed by the findings. 
Final Thoughts 
Politics adversely affected the International Olympic Movement at the beginning 
of the 1980s. In addition to the PRC's boycott, the USA's boycott in 1980 and the Soviet 
Union's retaliatory boycott in 1984 breached the Olympic Movement's philosophy at the 
time. The three countries' governments took advantage of the Olympic Games to attain 
their different national interests. They showed little concern for sport, the athletes, and 
the Olympic Games, which were each used as political weapons. In these three countries, 
national interests had the highest priority, and sport could be sacrificed whenever 
necessary. 
Therefore, from purely a political perspective, the decisions made by PRC were 
correct. In 1980, the PRC's boycott expressed its standpoint that was consistent with the 
US government thereby capitalizing on an opportunity to quickly improve their 
relationships with the USA. Meanwhile, by boycotting the Moscow Olympic Games, the 
PRC condemned the Soviet expansionism and protected its national security with more 
support from both the USA and Western countries. In 1984, the PRC's participation 
created a more supportive and cooperative international environment for its domestic 
economic development. Moreover, it was a perfect opportunity to achieve its goals 
because of absence of the athletes from the Soviet-bloc. The Chinese athletes won more 
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gold medals and significantly intensified the national glory and confidence of both the 
Chinese people and the PRC government. 
On the other hand, from a sport perspective, the decision to boycott the Olympic 
Games was wrong. After only three months of recognition by the IOC, the PRC chose to 
boycott the Olympic Games. No matter how many reasons they stated to justify the 
boycott, they lacked the basic respect due the Olympic Movement and the Olympic spirit. 
Furthermore, due to the boycott, Chinese athletes as well as those who could not compete 
in the Olympic Games once again became the victims of an international political 
struggle. The athletes' expression of sportsmanship was submerged by the continuous 
political conflicts and confrontations during the period. 
Future Research 
A number of areas for future study presented themselves throughout this research. 
Given the limited literature in respect to the development of Chinese national sport during 
this period and the decision-making process related to these two Olympic Games has 
developed, further research on these topics is necessary. The partial reason for the lack of 
study on Chinese national sport during this period is that both western and Chinese 
scholars have limited access to the materials and references for this period. Furthermore, 
it is clear that the existing knowledge and information base for this topic is limited. 
Beyond these limitations, certain important questions remain unanswered, which are in 
need of further investigation. For example, who was (were) the real decision maker(s) of 
the boycott in 1980? Given that the situations at the time were complicated, what was 
(were) the major factor(s) that resulted in the final decision in 1980? Given the fact that 
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Li Menghua was criticized due to the speech he made in Japan in January 1980 regarding 
the attitude of the PRC's participation, when was the decision made in 1980? What was 
the procedure of the decision-making? Since there was no hard evidence throughout the 
whole investigation, was the concern of the poor athletic performance a factor that 
resulted in the boycott decision in 1980? All these questions should be answered in future 
research as, or if, more archives of Chinese national sport are open to the public. 
This study concentrated on the political factors, especially those related to Sino-
Soviet and Sino-US relations, which affected the PRC's decisions on both the 1980 and 
1984 Olympic Games as well as the development of Chinese national sport between 1980 
and 1984. The period also saw the critical economic reform and readjustment throughout 
the PRC. The economic shift at the time deeply influenced the PRC political structure, 
Chinese society, and the Chinese people. There were also numerous significant events in 
the economic domain that influenced the development of sport in the PRC. Therefore, 
future research will be needed to take into account the economic factors during the period, 
which are also significant. 
Between 1980 and 1984, the GASC carried out a series of reforms, readjustment, 
and rearrangement for the future development of Chinese national sport. These efforts did 
work at the time, as the Chinese athletes' performance improved quickly. Because of the 
excellent achievement in the 1984 Olympic Games, the GASC then determined to 
maintain these new policies and rules. However, the further development of Chinese 
national sport proved that the reforms had their limitations and, to some degree, could not 
meet the emerging requirements in the sport domain. Future research will need to 
compare the differences between the development of Chinese national sport during the 
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period prior to the 1984 Olympic Games and the period following it thereby explaining 
why the reforms made between 1980 and 1984 had their limitations. 
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Summary of the PRC's Athletic Achievement in 
the Olympic Games since 1984 
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APPENDIX II 
Achievement Comparison between Japan and the Two 
Superpowers between 1960 and 1976. 
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APPENDIX III 
List of Planned Interviewees 
Cui Lequan: General Secretary of the Chinese Society of Sport History 
He Zhengling: COC president (1989-1994), member of the IOC (unavailable) 
Li Menghua: COC president (1986-1988) (unavailable) 
Lu Shengrong: Member of the IOC (unavailable) 
Pei Dongguang: Professor of Olympic Studies at the Beijing Capital Institute of Physical 
Education 
Wang Dinghua: Senior secretary of the GASC 
Wei Jizhong: Vice president of the COC (unavailable) 
Wu Shouzhang: Vice president of the COC 
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APPENDIX IV 
Interview Questionnaire (English Version) 
Return of the Eastern Giant; An Investigation of the Participation of the 
People's Republic of China in the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games 
A research study in partial fulfillment of a Masters Degree in Human Kinetics at the 
University of Windsor 
Subject Profile: 
Name: Title: 
Address: 
Telephone #: _( ) 
E-mail Address: 
Interview Date: Time Started: AM/PM Completed: AM/PM 
Briefing Paragraph: 
What will follow is approximately a 1 hour interview. Please note that you have the right 
to refuse to answer any of the questions. As stated in previous communication, your 
confidentiality will not be guaranteed as it is your input and authority that this study relies 
on. 
Briefing Checklist: 
Right to Refuse 
Informed 
Please answer YES or NO to the following statements. 
1.1 (subject name) consent to participate in this interview. 
Signed Consent Received: Verbal Consent: 
Yes No Yes No 
2.1 give consent for this interview to be audio recorded. 
Consent to Audio Record: 
Yes No 
3.1 would like to review a transcription of this interview material. 
Review of Transcript requested: 
Yes No 
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Questionnaire Outline: 
General Information 
1. Why did the national sport policy of the PRC shift strategically during the 1970s? 
• Was the shift influenced externally by the international political situation? 
i. If yes, describe the international political environment at the time. 
Probe: Sino-Soviet Union relations 
Sino-US relations 
Relationship change between the IOC and the PRC 
• Was the shift influenced internally by the domestic social realities within 
China? 
i. If yes, describe the domestic environment at that time. 
Probe: End of the Culture Revolution 
Politics & Economics reform after Mao 
End of the "Gang of Four" 
2. Describe the communications and competitions of Chinese national sport with 
other countries during the second half of the 1970s? 
• If you group the countries as "Western countries," "Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries," and "Asian-African-Latin American 
countries," which of these did Chinese national sport teams contact most 
frequently? 
i. Based on your response, do you think there is any difference from 
the facts prior to the 1970s? 
1. If yes, why were they different? 
Reinstatement 
3. Describe the preparation of the Chinese national sport for the COC's 
reinstatement by the IOC in 1979? 
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Probe: National sport organization structure 
Cultivation system for elite athletes 
International relations 
4. Describe the major issues that Chinese national sport was facing when the 
Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) was recognized by the IOC in 1979? 
5. To respond to the reinstatement, what were the decisions and resolutions 
regarding the Chinese national sport implemented to improve Chinese athletes' 
performance? 
6. How did the national sport policy change in China following the reinstatement in 
1979? 
The 1980 Olympic Games 
1. Following the reinstatement in 1979, were there any long-term plans, goals, or 
strategies of participation in future Olympic Games including the 1980 Lake 
Placid Winter Olympic Games and the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games? 
• If yes, describe it. 
Probe: When/Who made it 
If no, why? 
8. Did the COC initially consider participation in the 1980 Moscow Olympic 
Games? 
• If yes, 
i. What was the initial plan for the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games? 
ii. When did it make? 
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iii. Who were involved in this plan making? 
iv. How did the COC and the Chinese athletes prepare for the 
Moscow Olympic Games? 
• If no, what caused the absence? 
9. What was the PRC's response when they heard the advocacy of the boycott of the 
Moscow Olympic Games led by the Unites states in the beginning of 1980? 
10. Why did not the COC send delegation to the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980? 
• What were the reasons that finally led to the decision? 
• When was the decision made? 
• How long did it take to make this decision? 
• Who were involved in this decision-making? 
• Were there any opposed opinions? 
i. If yes, describe the situation 
11. Describe the international responses especially from the IOC, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States following the non-participation decision was released by the 
COC? 
12. Were there any potential relation between participation in the Lake Placid Winter 
Olympic Games and non-participation in the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980? 
• If yes, describe it. 
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13. How did this decision affect the relationship between the PRC and the Soviet 
Union both in sport domain and political domain at that time? 
Probe: Any event happened between two countries following the decision 
14. How did this decision affect the relationship between the PRC and the United 
States both in sport domain and political domain at that time? 
Probe: Any event happened between two countries following the decision 
The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games 
15. How did the national sport policy shift in China from 1980 to 1984? 
What reforms regarding the Chinese national sport were implemented to 
improve athletes' performance during the period? 
16. Describe the communications and competitions of Chinese national sport with 
other countries from 1980 to 1984? 
• If you group the countries as "Western countries," "Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries," and "Asian-African-Latin American 
countries," which of these did Chinese national sport teams contact most 
frequently? 
i. Based on your response, do you think there is any difference from 
the facts prior to 1980? 
1. If yes, why were they different? 
17. In contrast to the international level, describe the sport performance level of the 
Chinese athletes prior to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games? 
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18. What was the goal set for the Chinese athletes prior to the 1984 Los Angeles 
Olympic Games? 
19. What was the COC's initial response when they heard the boycott of the Los 
Angeles Olympic Games led by the Soviet Unions and followed by most of 
socialist countries? 
20. Despite most of the socialist countries boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic 
Games, the COC sent a 225-athlete contingent to compete, describe how the COC 
made this decision? 
• What factors were considered? 
• When was the decision made? 
• How long did the decision made? 
• Who were involved in this decision-making? 
• Were there any opposed opinions? 
i. If yes, describe it. 
Conclusion 
21. Is there anything that relates to the development of Olympic Movement in China 
from 1980 to 1984 that you feel I did not touch on that you would care to 
comment on? 
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Thank you for your time. It is greatly appreciated. 
(*** If participant requested opportunity to review transcript, read the following 
Over the next few weeks I will transcribe this interview and forward you a copy for your 
review and approval. Following completion of your review, please email or mail your 
approval, edits, comments, and any other information that you feel pertinent to this study. 
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APPENDIX V 
Interview Questionnaire (Chinese Version) 
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APPENDIX VI 
Comparison of Performance in Track and Field 
between Chinese Top Level and World Top Level (1980) 
Event 
100m 
200m 
400m 
800m 
1500m 
3000m 
5000m 
10000m 
Marathon 
110m(M) 
100m (F) 
Hurdle 
400m Hurdle 
3000m 
Steeplechase 
High Jump 
Long Jump 
Triple Jump 
Pole Vault 
Shot Put 
Discus 
Javelin 
Hammer 
Throw 
Decathlon 
Pentathlon 
Male 
China 
10"53 
21 "3 
47"94 
1'49"9 
3'46"2 
8'14"9 
14'03"2 
29'25"7 
2:16'57"4 
14"10 
51"36 
8'47"1 
2.29 
7.95 
17.02 
5.43 
17.6 
57.58 
89.14 
65.9 
7313 
World 
9"95 
19"72 
43"86 
1'42"4 
3'31"4 
7'32"1 
13'08"4 
27'22"5 
2:2'24" 
13" 
47"13 
8'05"4 
2.36 
8.9 
17.89 
5.79 
22.15 
71.16 
96.7 
81.8 
8649 
Difference 
0"58 
[ 1"58 
4"07 
7"5 
14"8 
42"8 
54"8 
2'03"2 
14'33"4 
1"10 
4"23 
41 "7 
0.07 
0.95 
0.87 
0.36 
4.55 
13.58 
7.56 
15.9 
1336 
Female 
China 
11 "89 
24"41 
55"08 
2'6"6 
4'22"4 
9'25"2 
13"68 
59"33 
1.92 
6.64 
17.74 
61.8 
59 
4248 
World 
10"87 
21"71 
48"6 
1'53"3 
3'55" 
8'32"1 
12"36 
54"28 
2.01 
7.09 
22.45 
71.8 
69.96 
5083 
Difference 
1"02 
2"7 
6"48 
13"1 
27"4 
53"1 
1"32 
5"05 
0.09 
0.65 
4.71 
10 
10.96 
835 
Data Source: 
China Sport Technology, no.24 (1981), p.3. Chinese National Library, Beijing, China. 
173 
APPENDIX VII 
Chronology of Major Events during the Economic Readjustment, 1980-84 
1980 
January: 
February: 
April: 
May: 
August: 
September: 
December: 
Decision to raise wages of workers and staff. 
Sino-America Agreement on Trade Relations signed. 
Li Renjun reports on the economic plan for 1980. 
China joins the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
State Statistical Bureau Communique on 1980. 
China joins the World Bank. 
Adoption of Regulations for the Guangdong Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ). 
Work Conference on employment. 
Wang Bingqian reports on 1979 budget results and estimates for 1980. 
(Reports 17 billion yuan deficit.) 
Yao Yilin reports on economic results in 1979 and plans for 1980 and 1981. 
Zhao Ziyang assumes premiership. 
Tax Laws for joint ventures promulgated. 
State Council Communique on improving the Agricultural Responsibility 
Scheme. 
Interim Regulations on foreign exchange control published. 
1981 
January: 
February: 
March: 
April: 
July: 
September: 
October: 
December: 
1982 
January: 
A new internal exchange rate adopted allowing enterprises to convert 
foreign exchange at a higher rate than the official rate. 
Further attempt to suspend Japanese contracts valued at US$2.6 billion. 
Yao Yilin announces a second, drastic stage in the Readjustment with a new 
plan for 1981 that involved a 40 per cent reduction in investment. 
IMF provides 4-5 billion SDR loan to support the Readjustment. 
State Planning Committee Report on diversifying the economy. 
IMF provides a further US$381 million loan for balance of payments 
support. 
Chen Yun's Instruction that plan and market regulation be combined and 
reformulated to make "plan the core, and markets the supplement." 
Recentralization of control over exports by Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
Regulations to democratize enterprise organization. 
Minister of Foreign Trade Li Jiang sacked. 
New package of Japanese financial support to solve problems arising from 
project cancellations. 
Zhao Ziyang announces extension of the Readjustment period for five years 
beyond 1981, and his principles for future economic development in China. 
Wang Bingqian reports final figures for 1980 budget and estimates for 1981. 
Publication of Regulations governing joint off-shore oil exploration and 
development. 
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February: 
March: 
April: 
May: 
June: 
July: 
Campaign to popularize rural responsibility systems. 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (OTIC) announces 
policy of seeking external funds for investment in renovation. 
Campaign against economic crimes begins. 
Ministries of Foreign Trade and Foreign Economic Relations merge into the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (incorporating the 
Import-Export Control Commission and the Foreign Investment Control 
Commission-MOFERT). 
Wang Bingqian reports on estimates for 1982 budget. 
Zhao Ziyang visits Japan. 
Wan Li affirms the three principles for conducting international economic 
relations. 
Third national population census begins. 
1983 
January: CCP Central Committee's "Document No. 1, 1983" on all aspects of rural 
policy circulated to cadres. 
March: MOFERT sends representatives to Guangzhou, Shanghai, Dalien and 
Tianjin to strengthen central supervision. 
April: SSB Communique for 1982. 
Ministry of Finance announces new tax rules to encourage joint ventures. 
CCP Central Committee's "Document No. 1, 1983" published. 
June: Wang Bingqian reports budget results for 1982 and estimates for 1983. 
Yao Yilin reports on the 1982 economic plan and targets for 1983. 
July: State Council approves new rules for foreign exchange control affecting 
joint and foreign enterprises. 
September: Revision of joint venture income tax rules to encourage investment. 
October. Western diplomats report estimates of 4,000 executions in China in two 
months for economic and other crimes. 
November: U.S. 3M Corporation allowed to establish the first wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiary in China. 
1984 
January: 
March: 
May: 
June: 
CCP Central Committee's "Document No. 1, 1984" on rural policy 
circulated to cadres. 
U.S. and China agree on double taxation rules. 
Song Ping reports on the economic plan for 1983 and the targets for 1984. 
Wang Bingqian reports on budget results for 1983 and estimates for 1984. 
Zhao Ziyang's Report on Government Work calls for continuing reforms in 
enterprise reorganization, planning and foreign trade. 
Central Committee publishes "Document No. 1, 1984." 
Data Source: The China Quarterly, no. 100 (December 1984), pp. vi-viii. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
1980 
January: 
February: 
April: 
June: 
1981 
February: 
March: 
June: 
July: 
A Chronology of Major Events of China Sport, 1980-84 
National sport working conference was held in Beijing. The main points of 
the conference were on adapting the shift of national economics and new 
era following the participation in the Olympic Games, improving of 
Chinese national sport as well as people's general health, and making the 
sport serving the four modernization. 
Football World was published by Chinese Football Association. 
Chinese sport delegation attended the 13th Winter Olympic Games held at 
Lake Placid, NY, USA. This was the debut of Chinese athletes at the 
Winter Olympic Games. 
COC announced that the Chinese athletes would not participate in the 
Moscow Olympic Games 
GASC, Ministry of Financial, Ministry of Labor, and Ministry of Culture 
issued the notice on the utilization of sport facilities. 
GASC held a conference discussing theories of sport. 
GASC held the working conference for provincial and autonomous 
regional sport directors. 
Chinese university athletes participated in the 10l Winter Universiade 
held at Spain. 
IOC announced that Taiwan Olympic Committee agreed to change the 
title to Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee. 
Chinese athletes won 11 gold medals at Asian Athletic Championship 
Chinese university athletes participated in the 11th Summer Universiade 
held at Romania. 
August: GASC held a propaganda conference at Qin Huang Dao. 
September: National minority sport conference was held at Beijing. 
Sport Science was established. 
October. GASC and COC held a conference at Beijing regarding the sport 
communications between Taiwan and China. 
1982 
January: Encyclopedia of China: Sport was issued 
March: Sport division of National Committee of Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference was established and had the first meeting; 
Director's name was Gaotang Rong. 
April: GASC issued a notice: developing track and field throughtout the country. 
June: GASC held a conference of Sport directors of Province, City, and 
Autonomous Region. 
July: China Sport Science Society held a conference at Yantai. 
Chinese Journal of Sports Medicine was established. 
August: GASC issued National Sport and Exercise Guidelines with the permission 
from State Council. 
November: GASC, Ministry of Culture, and Chinese Communist Youth League held a 
nation rural sport conference. 
Chinese Sport delegation attended the 9 Asian Games at India, with 144 
member nations attended, and finished with the first position. 
1983 
February: GASC held a national sport conference at Beijing. 
April: National Senior Sport Association was established. 
May: International table tennis association held a conference at Tokyo and 
accepted Chinese Taibei table tennis association as a member. 
GASC issued a notice: advice for further improving school sport. 
June: National sport antique held a conference at Zhehgzhou, Henan province. 
September: Samaranch, President of the IOC, awarded an Olympic silver medal to 
Gaotang Rong. 
October: Members and athlete representatives of Disability Sports in China held a 
conference in Tianjin and established the Chinese Association of 
Disability Sports in. 
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1984 
January: 
March: 
GASC held a working conference for sport directors from provinces, city, 
and autonomous regions. 
GASC announced that Feather ball, a Chinese traditional sport, became an 
official sport event. 
GASC announced a notice regarding the regulations for sport news in the 
media. 
June: 
July: 
August: 
October: 
December: 
GASC, All China Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese Communist Youth 
League, State of Women Association, and PLA held a conference and 
issued a notice regarding the development of mass swimming activity. 
The State Council approved that National Youth Sport Games would be 
held every four years. 
Chinese Sport delegation won 15 golden medals, 8 silver medals, and 9 
bronze medals at the 23rd Olympic Games and won the fourth position on 
the tally. 
GASC issued a notice on reducing the violations in the stadiums. 
GASC held a conference regarding the national sport strategies and 
reformations. 
The PRC government announced a notice on further development of sport. 
China Fishing was established 
GASC revised the National Record Monitoring System and The Athletes 
Grades System and planned to implement on Jan 1st 1985. 
Data Sources: 
1. China's Sport Year Book, eds., Policy Research Department of the GASC, 1982, 
1985. 
2. Li, Xiumei. Brief History of Sport of the People's Republic of China. Beijing: Beijing 
Sport University Press, 2001. 
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APPENDIX IX 
Achievement of Chinese National Sport, 1980-1984 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Total 
International 
Competitions 
68 
55 
301 
73 
99 
325 
Gold Medals 
Achieved 
290 
295 
415 
n/a 
n/a 
1000 
World 
Champions 
3 
25 
13 
39 
33 
113 
World 
Records 
7 
8 
11 
17 
12 
55 
Data Source: 
China Sport News, "Significant Achievement in Chinese National Sport." no. 2167, 
December 18, 1981, section 1; "Our Athletes Won 295 Gold Medals Last Year." no. 
2187, February 3,1982, section 1; "Running to New Road: Chinese National Sport in 
1982." no. 2338, December 31, 1982, section 1; "Significant Breakthrough: Chinese 
National Sport in 1982." no. 2338, December 31, 1982, section 4; "Breakthrough in 
1983." no. 2549, December 28, 1983, section 1; "Li Menghua's Speech at 1983 National 
Sport Working Conference." no. 2344, January 12, 1983, section 1. 
China's Sport Year Book, 1985, eds., Policy Research Department of the GASC, pp. 188-
190. 
n/a: data is not available 
1
 The amount of international competitions for 1982 is an approximate value, based on 
director of the GASC, Li Menghua's Speech at 1982 National Sport Working Conference 
APPENDIX X 
Comparison of the Performance between the Chinese Winners at Los Angeles 
Olympic Games and the Winners at the Friendship Games in Moscow (1984) 
Chinese 
Olympians 
Zhou Jihong 
Li Ning 
Li Ning 
Li Ning 
Lou Yun 
Ma Yanhong 
Volleyball 
Li Yuwei 
Xu Haifeng 
Wu Xiaoxuan 
Zeng Guoqiang 
Wu Shude 
Chen Weiqiang 
Yao Jingyuan 
Luan Jujie 
Events 
Women's 10 m 
Diving 
Men's Floor Exercise 
Pommel Horse 
Still Rings 
Men's Vault 
Uneven Bars 
Women's team 
Men's 50 m Running 
Target 
Men's 50 m Pistol 
Women's 50 m 
Standard Rifle 
Men's 52 kg Class 
Weightlifting 
Men's 56 kg Class 
Men's 60 kg Class 
Men's 67.5 kg Class 
Women's Foil 
Fencing 
Records 
435.51 pts 
19.925 pts 
19.950 pts 
19.850 pts 
19.950 pts 
19.950 pts 
587 
566 
581 
235 kg 
267.5 kg 
285.5 kg 
320 kg 
Records of 
Friendship Games 
at the same events 
483.18 pts 
Lower 
Lower 
19.975 pts 
Lower 
20 pts 
592 
578 
583 
252.5 kg 
297.5 kg 
322.5 kg 
337.5 kg 
Data source: 
1. The Official Website of the Chinese Olympic Committee 
2. Yu Zhao, The Dream of Strengthening the Country: The Secrets of Chinese National 
Sport. (Beijing: The Writers Publishing House, 1988), pp. 12-14. 
APPENDIX XI 
List of the Planned Archival Sources 
1. Beijing Capital Library 
2. Beijing National Library 
3. The Library in Beijing Sport University 
4. The Chinese National Sport Archives in the General Administration of Sport of China 
(Located at China National Sport Museum) (Archives cannot be accessed) 
5. The States Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China (Archives 
cannot be accessed) 
6. The Los Angeles Amateur Athletic Foundation (http://www.aafla.org) 
7. The Chinese Olympic Committee Archives (Archives cannot be accessed) 
8. The Library at Beijing Capital Institute of Physical Education 
9. The Information Center at the General Administration of Sport of China 
10. The Library at the China Sport Publications Corporation 
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